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Singapore has not been involved in any wars since WWII. Beginning in the late 
1970s, the small island-state has been doing well; its economy is flourishing, and its 
relations with its regional neighbors and the international community have been steadily 
strengthening. Yet, in the past 50 years since independence in 1965, Singapore’s military 
strategy has undergone two distinct shifts, evolving from the Poisonous Shrimp to the 
Porcupine in the early 1980s, and then finally to the Dolphin in the early 2000s. What 
drove these shifts? This thesis takes a historical analysis approach in investigating the 
evolution of Singapore’s military strategy, studying each shift as a unique case study.  
By comparing the two shifts, the thesis identifies three key factors that have 
driven the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy: change of security environment, 
change of economic conditions, and to a lesser extent, change of international norms and 
expectations. The evidence examined supports the argument that the change of security 
environment was the underlying driving force for the first shift, while the change of 
economic conditions was the main cause of the second shift. These insights facilitate 
better understanding of Singapore’s security priorities and its focus on peaceful co-
existence.  
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION ..............................................................2 
B.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................3 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................4 
1.  Examining Each Evolutionary Stage of Singapore’s Military 
Strategy ...........................................................................................4 
2.  Explaining the Changes in Singapore’s Military Strategies .........10 
D.  KEY ASSESSMENTS AND CRITIQUES ................................................17 
E.  POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ..........................18 
F.  RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................19 
G.  THESIS OVERVIEW .................................................................................19 
II.  THE FIRST SHIFT: FROM POISONOUS SHRIMP TO PORCUPINE ...........21 
A.  BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................21 
B.  DECLARING THE FIRST SHIFT ............................................................24 
C.  EXPLAINING THE SHIFT ........................................................................28 
1.  Change of Security Environment ....................................................28 
2.  Change of Economic Conditions......................................................32 
D.  SUMMARY ..................................................................................................34 
III. THE SECOND SHIFT: FROM PORCUPINE TO DOLPHIN ............................37 
A.  THE DOLPHIN STRATEGY—KEY CHARACTERISTICS ................37 
B.  EXPLAINING THE SHIFT ........................................................................39 
1.  Change of Security Environment ....................................................39 
2.  Change of Economic Conditions......................................................46 
3.  Change of International Norms and Expectations ........................51 
C.  SUMMARY ..................................................................................................54 
IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................57 
A.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .......................................................................58 
1.  The First Shift ...................................................................................58 
2.  The Second Shift ...............................................................................60 
B.  CONCLUDING ANALYSIS .......................................................................62 
1.  Security Environment .......................................................................63 
2.  Economic Conditions ........................................................................63 
3.  International Norms and Expectations ...........................................64 
C.  WHAT’S NEXT, SINGAPORE?................................................................65 
 viii
1.  Key Assumptions and Expected Drivers of the Next Shift ............65 
2.  What Are the Options? .....................................................................66 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................69 




LIST OF TABLES  




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1G SAF 1st Generation Singapore Armed Forces 
2G SAF 2nd Generation Singapore Armed Forces 
3G SAF 3rd Generation Singapore Armed Forces 
HADR Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief 
MAF Malaysian Armed Forces 
PAP People’s Action Party 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force 
RSN Republic of Singapore Navy 
SAF Singapore Armed Forces 















In August 1965, Singapore “unexpectedly” gained independence after a “bitter 
separation” from the Malaysian Federation and was left to find the means to survive the 
harsh realities of the world, a task the young nation was neither equipped nor prepared 
for.1 Economically, the island-state lacked natural resources and was heavily dependent 
on Malaysia for trade; as a nation, it was fragile and surrounded by hostile Malay 
neighbors.2 The sudden withdrawal of British troops by the late 1960s created a deep 
sense of abandonment among Singapore’s leaders and exacerbated the nation’s security 
challenges.3 These circumstances contributed to Singapore’s realist worldview and 
obsession with the “twin themes of survival and vulnerability”4 that dominated the young 
nation’s post-independence era and continue to influence its policies even to this day. 
Vulnerable and desperate at independence, Singapore had to protect its national interests, 
and it needed a solution quickly. With the help of Israel, the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF) was developed from scratch, and it became the core of what was unofficially 
described by the nation’s leaders and scholars alike as the “Poisonous Shrimp” strategy, 
designed “to provide for Singapore’s basic defense.”5  
As Singapore’s security environment and economic conditions evolved, its 
military strategy underwent two distinct shifts. In the 1980s, it adopted a new strategy 
known as the “Porcupine,” and in the early 2000s it replaced that strategy with one that 
has been labeled the “Dolphin.” This thesis describes each of these three strategies and 
offers an explanation for the two shifts in Singapore’s military strategy. In doing so, this 
                                                 
1 Narayanan Ganesan, “Singapore: Realist-cum-Trading State,” in Asian Security Practice: Material 
and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 585, 591, 
586. 
2 Ibid., 579. 
3 Marsita Omar and Fook Weng Chan, “British Withdrawal from Singapore,” Singapore Infopedia, 
National Library Board, accessed June 13, 2016, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/
SIP_1001_2009-02-10.html. 
4 Ganesan, “Singapore: Realist-cum-Trading State,” 586. 
5 “History of the MINDEF/SAF,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/about_us/history/overview.html#tab-4. 
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thesis explores the unique relationship between changes in security environment and 
economic conditions as the two most important factors driving the evolution of 
Singapore’s military strategy. It argues that while the change of Singapore’s security 
environment drove the first shift, it was supported by the country’s growing economy, 
which though important, was not developed enough during the 1970s to influence 
Singapore’s military strategy directly. With consistent growth, however, Singapore’s 
economy matured considerably by the 1990s, causing the country’s economic interests to 
become increasingly integrated with its security priorities and thus its military strategy. 
As such, the change of economic conditions emerged as the lead driving force in the 
second shift and had an immense impact in shaping the Dolphin strategy. These 
observations show that despite the consistent geographical and strategic realities that 
amplify the importance of a country’s security environment in shaping its military 
strategy particularly at independence, changes in economic conditions can potentially 
have a similar impact once the potential of its economy has been sufficiently realized; 
this finding is particularly insightful when conducting studies on other developing 
countries that share similar characteristics with Singapore. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Singapore has not been involved in any wars since WWII, yet in the past 50 years 
the small island-state has been consistently enhancing its security, resulting in two shifts 
in its military strategy. Since the nation-state’s independence in 1965, besides “the 
Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore, and Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, Southeast Asia has otherwise been relatively free of intra-regional wars.”6 
Regionally, Zachary Abuza asserts that by the early 1990s, “Southeast Asia was arguably 
at its most secure point in the post-Second World War era.”7 At the bilateral front, though 
Singapore’s relations with its immediate neighbors—Indonesia and Malaysia—started 
out badly, they have since improved considerably. Domestically, analysts also agree that 
                                                 
6 Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “Transforming the Strategic Landscape of Southeast Asia,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 3 (2005): 398. 
7 Zachary Abuza, “Hardening National Security: Emergence of an Agile Scorpion,” in Impressions of 
the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, ed. Bridget Welsh (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 188. 
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there is a level of consistency in the Singaporean leadership, its concept of national 
security, and its approach toward threats. Against such a setting, the fact that Singapore’s 
military strategy has undergone any change, let alone two realignments, invites further 
research. Scholars have tried to explain the shifts in Singapore’s military strategy, but 
their analyses have varied. What then, are the key factors that best explain the shifts 
in Singapore’s military strategy? It would be interesting to see if and how these key 
factors continue to drive future changes in the evolution of the nation-state’s military 
strategy. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
Much research and analysis have been conducted on Singapore’s military 
strategy, especially on the shift from Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine; in comparison, 
however, studies on the shift to the Dolphin are less comprehensive, perhaps because it is 
more recent. Also, besides Bernard Loo, few others have attempted to address both shifts 
in a single piece of work, and even then, Loo’s discussion of the two shifts was kept 
broad and did not take a comparative approach since that was not the purpose of his 
contribution.8 As Singapore has been independent for more than 50 years, this paper 
contributes academically as a review and consolidation of key explanations by various 
analysts. In addition, by comparing the first shift with the second, this thesis seeks to 
uncover consistent themes that could help predict a potential third shift in the 
evolutionary process of Singapore’s military strategy. 
According to Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore’s ambassador-at-large and policy 
advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Small countries will always have fewer 
options and operate on narrower margins than big countries, but rich small countries will 
have more options than poor small countries.”9 Singapore is a rich small country today; 
being small is a consistent factor for the nation-state, but it was not always rich and may 
                                                 
8 Bernard Fook Weng Loo discussed the two shifts in his article: “Maturing the Singapore Armed 
Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin,” in Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, ed. 
Bridget Welsh (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 178–187. 
9 Bilahari Kausikan, “Dealing with An Ambiguous World,” The Middle Ground, May 26, 2016, 
http://themiddleground.sg/2016/05/26/dealing-ambiguous-world. 
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not necessarily remain rich. The research question contributes to the understanding of the 
available options and factors that shaped Singapore’s military strategy as the country 
grew stronger economically. It thus also provides insights as to how Singapore’s military 
strategy may be influenced by periods of economic crisis, or if the island-state loses its 
wealth.  
Finally, the strategic location of Singapore and its international hub status make it 
an important actor in the maintenance of security and economic stability in Southeast 
Asia as well. Understanding what has driven the evolution of Singapore’s military 
strategy contributes to the predictability of its intentions and actions; this understanding 
will help guide policy making among its neighbors, in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, 
to which Singapore’s “foreign policy has often invited criticisms about its alleged self-
aggrandizement at the expense of the region.”10  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review organizes existing work on Singapore’s military strategy 
into three sections. First, interpretations of what leading scholars agree are the key 
features of each zoological analogy are summarized, framing the foundational conditions 
for the subsequent sections. Second, key explanations for each of the two changes in 
military strategy are examined and compared for dominant themes that can help 
formulate hypotheses. Third, key assessments and critiques of the literature are presented 
as a lead up to the hypotheses. 
1. Examining Each Evolutionary Stage of Singapore’s Military Strategy 
Across the literature examined, two interconnected and recurring themes stood 
out. First, though never explicitly defined by government officials or scholars, the 
centrality of the SAF in these analogies is evident. This paper agrees with Loo that the 
SAF’s “three processes of evolutionary change”11 were almost in tandem with the 
                                                 
10 See Seng Tan, “Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore’s 
Evolving Defense and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 333. 
11 Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “The Management of Military Change: The Case of the Singapore Armed 
Forces,” in Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional Perspectives, eds. 
Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers, and Michael Raska (New York: Routledge, 2015), 70. 
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declaratory shifts in zoological analogies, and as such, it is almost “possible to 
[synonymously] associate the three analogies with the three generations of evolution of 
the SAF.”12 Second, scholars and Singaporean leaders alike interchangeably refer to the 
analogies as the SAF’s acquired capabilities, intended use, and projected image and 
posture. The zoological analogies represent more than just the SAF’s posture or image; 
they are also not intended as a representation of Singapore’s overarching national defense 
responsibility undertaken by Total Defense,13 of which military is one component out of 
five.14 As such, for the purpose and scope of this paper, the analogies are defined as 
military strategies, thereby limiting the scope of research to how the SAF would be 
utilized to achieve its stated mission “to enhance Singapore’s peace and security through 
deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory 
over the aggressor.”15 The rest of this section summarizes what leading scholars agree are 
the key characteristics of each zoological analogy. 
a. Poisonous Shrimp—1960s to 1980s 
Singapore’s founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew first introduced the analogy 
of the Poisonous Shrimp saying, “In a world where the big fish eat small fish and the 
small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp.”16 According to Tim 
Huxley, “Singapore [eventually] used the analogy of poisonous shrimp (small, but 
digestible by predators) to describe its military strategy.”17 The strategy was centered on 
the Israeli-influenced “1st Generation SAF”18 (1G SAF) that was “defensively oriented 
                                                 
12 Loo, “The Management of Military Change,” 70. 
13 See Seng Tan, “Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves,” 335. 
14 “The 5 Pillars of Total Defense,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about_us/5_Pillars.html. 
15 “Mission,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/
mission.html. 
16 Tommy Koh, “A World Statesman,” Straits Times, accessed June 13, 2016, 
http://leekuanyew.straitstimes.com/ST/chapter3.html. 
17 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, (New South Wales, 
Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 56. 
18 “History of the MINDEF/SAF,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/about_us/history/overview.html#tab-4; Michael Raska, Military Innovation in Small States: 
Creating a Reverse Asymmetry (New York: Routledge, 2015), 146. 
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and based on an infantry-dominated army.”19 Though not Singapore’s initial model of 
choice, no other country was willing to offer military assistance. Nonetheless, the island-
state’s leaders were “impressed that Israel was able to survive despite outright hostility 
from its much larger neighbors”20 and were convinced that Singapore would benefit from 
the Israelis’ guidance.  
Up to the mid-1970s, the SAF was made up of a “large citizen army based on 
universal but mainly part-time conscription,” a small but “largely professional air force,” 
and a “semi-regular navy”21 that was equipped with a few small boats that limited its 
function to coastal patrols. Limited by the capabilities of the 1G SAF, the idea of the 
Poisonous Shrimp was modest, centered primarily on deterrence by raising “an 
aggressor’s cost of attacking Singapore to such an undesirable level that no country 
would consider invading it.”22 The problem with the Poisonous Shrimp, however, was 
that it was “defeatist”23 in the sense that the fall of the nation-state was considered 
inevitable in war even though the aggressor might also take considerable damage. Such a 
position would gradually become less acceptable as Singapore progressed as a country. 
b. Porcupine—1980s to Early 2000s 
As Singapore developed and grew economically, its leaders introduced a different 
strategy to protect the nation’s strategic interests, shifting from a “counter-insurgency 
doctrine to a more conventional military posture.”24 In 1983, Goh Chok Tong, then 
Singapore’s Minister of Defense and Second Minister for Health used the Porcupine 
analogy in a speech to emphasize the necessity for Singapore to enhance its 
                                                 
19 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 56. 
20 Andrew Tan, “Singapore’s Defense: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 21, no. 3 (1999): 454. 
21 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 23. 
22 Pak Shun Ng, “From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine: An Analysis of Singapore’s Defense Posture 
Change in the Early 1980s,” (working paper, Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, 2005), 1. 
23 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces,” 179. 
24 Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “New Problems, New Answers? The Revolution in Military Affairs in an 
Era of Changing Security Concerns,” National Institute of Defense Studies, accessed June 13, 2016, 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2005/e2005_04.pdf. 
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survivability.25 By the early 1990s, it became evident that the way the Porcupine strategy 
sought to achieve enhanced survivability was through the projection of “at least limited 
military power (the porcupine’s quills) at some distance from its shores,”26 so as to defeat 
the enemy in its own territory; this was a distinct shift from the Poisonous Shrimp that 
provided only two options as a strategy: “suicide or surrender.”27 Analysts agreed that 
Singapore’s rapid economic growth helped the Porcupine strategy achieve its new 
objectives, funding the required capability upgrades in the Singapore Army, Republic of 
Singapore Navy (RSN), and Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), which formed the 
“2nd Generation SAF” (2G SAF).28  
The 2G SAF was an integral part of the Porcupine strategy, shaped by the specific 
requirements the Porcupine was designed to address. Andrew Tan accurately described 
the 2G SAF to be “largely modeled on the Israeli Defense Force, with its emphasis on air 
superiority, armor, and pre-emptive defense.”29 In particular, the upgrade of the RSAF 
with “early warning capabilities and long-range striking power”30 was congruent with the 
shift in strategy “from a defensive deterrence policy to a more active deterrence 
alternative”31 that was capable of “preemptive”32 strikes to deliver a “knock-out punch in 
round one.”33 Loo asserted that the “preemptive posture envisaged by the Porcupine 
meant that in the event of hostilities, the SAF would strike first, establish the front line in 
the likely enemy’s territory and prevent the enemy from being able to bring fire power to 
bear on the population and economic centers of Singapore.”34 To achieve this, the 
Porcupine strategy had to rely heavily on the strength of Singapore’s air force and armor 
                                                 
25 Loo, “New Problems, New Answers?” 
26 Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 146. 
27 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 57. 
28 “History of the MINDEFG/SAF,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/about_us/history/overview.html#tab-4; Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 146. 
29 Andrew Tan, “Singapore’s Defense: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,”) 457. 
30 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 23. 
31 Ng, From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine, 1. 
32 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces: From Poisonous Shrimp to Dolphin,” 180. 
33 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 57. 
34 Loo, “The Management of Military Change,” 74. 
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capabilities. Nevertheless, there was also a new emphasis on building a credible navy 
capable of conducting limited “sea denial”35 missions and dealing with threats to 
maritime security and seaborne trade. This emphasis reflected the island-state’s growing 
focus on the maritime domain beginning from the late 1970s. 
c. Dolphin —2000s to Present 
By the 2000s, bolstered by consistent economic growth, Singapore’s military 
strategy evolved into the Dolphin, in tandem with the development of the “3rd 
Generation SAF”36 (3G SAF). Analysts have agreed that the Dolphin strategy, with the 
3G SAF as its core, is characterized by the use of “intelligence, speed, and 
maneuverability in a spectrum of diverse missions: from defense diplomacy and 
operations other than war to kinetic precision strike capabilities conducted further afield 
from the immediate environment of Singapore.”37 While the Porcupine focused on 
conventional force projection and preemption, the Dolphin has focused on integrated 
“joint operations”38 and “full-spectrum dominance”39—or “military-speak for the ability 
to do everything on all fronts and do it well.”40 At the same time, this strategy still retains 
a strong focus on deterrence, albeit in a more sophisticated manner. In this regard, the 
Dolphin took the approach of “preventive deterrence” centered on building shared 
awareness, regional confidence, and stronger relations through leading regional security 
initiatives and Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts. The idea is that 
through defense diplomacy, regional and extra-regional states will not be threatened by a 
                                                 
35 Swee Lean Collin Koh, “Seeking Balance: Force Projection, Confidence Building, and the Republic 
of Singapore Navy,” Naval War College Review 65, no.1 (2012): 81. 
36 “History of the MINDEFG/SAF,” MINDEF, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
imindef/about_us/history/overview.html#tab-4; Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 146. 
37 Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 146.  
38 Loo, “Maturing the Singapore Armed Forces,”181. 
39 Benson Chian, “Should the SAF Maintain its Existing Focus on Full-Spectrum Dominance or, 
Should the Organisation Return to its Core Deterrence and War-Fighting Mission?” POINTER, Journal of 





40 Tan, “Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves,” 353. 
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successful Singapore and instead will find it in their own interests to contribute to 
Singapore’s continued stability and success so as to reap mutual benefits. This strategy 
thereby prevents any thoughts of harming the island-state to even take shape.  
At the same time, the Dolphin strategy, enabled by the enhanced capabilities and 
reach of the 3G SAF, was also designed to deal with emerging threats like piracy and 
terrorism, and to protect Singapore’s economic interests at the global stage. To achieve 
this, the Dolphin strategy incorporated a significant increase in maritime focus. The RSN 
inevitably began to play a bigger role, because “compared to air and land forces, navies 
are an inherently flexible instrument of the state which can be used in war and in 
peacetime to further a state’s interests.”41 Nonetheless, the Dolphin strategy still retained 
a potentially aggressive deterrent factor with its “emphasis on swift and agile attacks 
upon its foes, much as dolphins are said to strike at sharks”42 when required. Backed by 
the SAF’s technologically superior capabilities, the Dolphin strategy also expanded its 
maritime scope from “sea denial [in the Porcupine] in local waters to limited, defensive 
sea control.”43  
The summary of the key characteristics of the Poisonous Shrimp, the Porcupine, 
and the Dolphin strategies are presented in Table 1. 
                                                 
41 Andrew Tan, “The Emergence of Naval Power in the Straits of Malacca,” Defense Studies, 12:1, 
120, DOI: 10.1080/14702435.2012.683975 
42 Jonathon Gad, “Poison Shrimp, Porcupines, and Dolphins: Singapore Is Packing Some Serious 
Heat,” Vice News (Blog), accessed August 29, 2016, https://news.vice.com/article/poison-shrimp-
porcupines-and-dolphins-singapore-is-packing-some-serious-heat. 
43 Koh, “Seeking Balance,” 79. 
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2. Explaining the Changes in Singapore’s Military Strategies  
There were two distinct shifts in Singapore’s military strategy since independence 
in 1965; the first took place during the 1980s, and the second in the early 2000s.   
a. The First Shift—From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine 
Analysts have identified two main factors that drove the shift from the Poisonous 
Shrimp to the Porcupine strategy: change of security environment and change of 
economic conditions. 
(1) Change of Security Environment 
The security vacuum created by the departure of the British, combined with 
bilateral and regional tensions in the 1970s, amplified Singapore’s sense of vulnerability 
 11
to external threats,44 driving the first shift in the evolution of Singapore’s military 
strategy. Deterioration of sub-regional relations, in particular, with Malaysia and to a 
lesser extent Indonesia,45 had an immense influence in shaping Singapore’s military 
strategy. Analysts viewed Malaysia as the main threat to Singapore’s security due to its 
geographical proximity and historical relations leading to Singapore’s independence; 
other strategic concerns also added to Singapore’s sense of vulnerability. For example, 
Malaysia’s consistent “threats to [turn off] Singapore’s vital water supplies”46 whenever 
there are disagreements has exacerbated these concerns.47 Malaysia and Indonesia have 
also tended to assert political pressure on newly independent Singapore to influence its 
foreign policies. The Poisonous Shrimp strategy was inadequate to effectively deter these 
sub-regional threats. In response, Singapore’s leadership was convinced that a new 
strategy was required, one that could not only deter invasion but also “deter military, 
political, or economic pressure from regional states.”48 
Beyond the sub-region, new types of threats were emerging that also reinforced 
the need for a new strategy to replace the “Poisonous Shrimp.” Andrew Tan describes the 
1970s as a period of “heightened political instability”49 in Southeast Asia, characterized 
by “changed geopolitical realities.”50 Andrew Tan and Derek Da Cunha support the 
argument that Southeast Asia was threatened by the Soviet’s export of revolution and 
communist ideas.51 In particular, Soviet aircraft activity out of Cam Ranh Bay in 
Vietnam triggered concerns for regional security, which would have an impact on 
Singapore as well.52 Threats from extra-regional powers also extended to the maritime 
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domain. Huxley and Da Cunha assert that the growth in maritime trade during the late 
1970s resulted in extra-regional navies also seeking to expand their influence in 
Southeast Asia, adding to Singapore’s security challenges and thus were viewed with 
caution. The change of Singapore’s security environment in the early 1970s thus revealed 
crucial weaknesses in the army-centric and defense-focused Poisonous Shrimp strategy, 
making the shift to the Porcupine necessary. 
(2) Change of Economic Conditions 
Economic factors also contributed to the evolution of Singapore’s military 
strategy from the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine, albeit more significantly in a 
supporting role. To Loo, the shift to the Porcupine strategy was “underpinned by rapid 
economic growth, which provided increasing economic power and a corresponding 
increase in defense spending.”53 Besides funding military capability development, 
Huxley asserts that economic development made Singapore “vitally dependent on foreign 
investment.”54 Thus, the nation had to make changes to its military strategy to enhance its 
security and deterrence profile to secure investor confidence. Any “loss of confidence in 
the republic’s stability or security would seriously damage its economic health.”55 The 
defeatist nature of the original strategy did not instill confidence and had to be replaced 
by one that was able to take the fight to the adversary in a quick and decisive battle. Such 
requirements thus shaped the Porcupine strategy’s focus on pre-emptive strikes, backed 
by strong air force and armor capabilities. 
As a result of global economic growth, the maritime domain became increasingly 
important to Singapore in the late 1970s. Huxley asserts that because Singapore is an 
island-state heavily dependent on seaborne trade, secure Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) and uninterrupted maritime trade are vital not just to its economy, but to its very 
existence as a sovereign state as well.56 Unfortunately, access to and from the island-state 
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and the “high seas, on which it depends for 85 percent of its trade,”57 are through 
Malaysian and Indonesian waters.58 Thus, Singapore’s military strategy would need a 
more credible navy and maritime focus to protect its expanding maritime interests, 
growing economy, and foreign investments. As Singapore’s economy developed in the 
1970s, there was more impetus for a change to a new strategy as not only could the 
country now afford to upgrade the SAF, it also had more at stake; economic 
considerations were thus gradually becoming more influential in shaping Singapore’s 
military strategy. 
b. The Second Shift—From Porcupine to Dolphin 
Analysts agree that the shift to the Dolphin strategy occurred amid unprecedented 
regional peace and stability. In terms of meeting its military objectives, the Porcupine 
seemed relatively successful and did not warrant much, if any, change in strategy. 
Nevertheless, there was a second shift in military strategy in the early 2000s, and the shift 
to the Dolphin was assessed to be even more drastic than the first. Three key reasons 
account for the shift from the Porcupine to the Dolphin strategy: change of security 
environment, change of economic conditions, and change of international norms and 
expectations. 
(1) Change of Security Environment 
Just like in the first shift, changes in Singapore’s security environment were also 
instrumental in driving the second shift and shaping the Dolphin strategy. The influence 
of this key driver in the second shift, however, was less prominent as the period 
preceding the shift was characterized by overall improving relations, which in turn 
afforded Singapore more flexibility in its military strategy. In particular, Huxley asserts 
that Singapore’s relations with its sub-regional neighbors improved considerably 
following the change in respective key leadership positions around the 2000s, paving the 
way for improved relations and increased cooperation.59 Shang-Su Wu supports this 
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assessment, and also highlights a corresponding shift in the focus and structure of the 
SAF in tandem with the shift to the Dolphin strategy.60 Nonetheless, Singapore’s 
leadership was cognizant that sub-regional relations were unpredictable and susceptible 
to sudden downturns.61 As such even though sub-regional relations facilitated the shift to 
a new military strategy, maintaining the SAF’s military superiority over neighboring 
militaries remained a national priority. Such considerations ensured that the Dolphin 
retained a strong deterrent capability despite these positive aspects of the change in 
security environment. 
Though sub-regional relations improved, other types of threats emerged in the late 
1990s that also contributed to the shift to the Dolphin strategy. Da Cunha asserts that, due 
to regional economic growth and a rise in global trade, the maritime domain grew in 
importance and in turn drove the growth of regional navies in Southeast Asia. Such 
developments enabled regional stakeholders to assert their maritime influence, potentially 
infringing on Singapore’s sovereignty. Singapore’s leadership was adamant for the 
island-state to remain militarily superior so as to prevent such thoughts from 
developing.62 In addition, there was a conscious effort among regional states to maintain 
the good relations that had contributed to the consistent economic growth in Southeast 
Asia. In this aspect, regional militaries were increasingly being used to promote 
confidence and cooperation among Singapore’s neighbors as well.63 The Porcupine 
strategy, however, was unable to effectively meet these new objectives and thus needed 
to be replaced. 
Singapore’s security landscape, however, was not limited to conventional threats 
alone. Analysts agree that during the 1990s, there was a “shift in the [regional and 
international] security landscape, which widened to include non-conventional threats 
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such as terrorism and piracy.”64 Wu asserts that Singapore’s position as an international 
financial and travel hub, “stable international status,”65 and strong relations with the 
United States made it an attractive target for terrorist attacks. In addition, Singapore’s 
Muslim neighbors were now not only potential military threats but became sources of 
emerging non-conventional threats as well. Andrew Tan also highlights the rise of piracy 
in Southeast Asia, which coincided with the rise of global maritime terrorism, leading to 
“heightened fears of a terrorism-piracy nexus that could lead to a devastating maritime 
terrorist attack.”66 These factors thus contributed to a more complex strategic security 
environment for Singapore,67 which the Porcupine was unable to address; more 
significantly, these new threats targeted Singapore’s strategic infrastructures and 
economic stability, raising the stakes for the young nation and thus driving the need for a 
new military strategy. 
(2) Change of Economic Conditions 
Scholars agree that economic growth started to play an increasingly crucial role in 
funding and shaping the change to the Dolphin strategy. Consistent economic growth 
made any forms of conflict increasingly unpalatable, and thus the aggressively deterrent 
Porcupine strategy began to lose its appeal among Singapore’s policy makers. Huxley 
adds that consistent economic growth was not only crucial in financing military 
development, but it also enabled Singapore “to reduce the city-state’s vulnerabilities,”68 
notably by taking steps to decrease its dependency on Malaysia for water and food by 
financing the purchase of “alternative supplies”69 from Indonesia and Thailand. In 
addition, economic growth financed research, the development of technology, and 
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“construction of desalination and water recycling plants,”70 enabling Singapore to 
gradually improve its self-sufficiency for water. Wu argues that “[t]he diminution or 
elimination of the dependency on Malaysia for water could lower or defuse any motive 
for an offensive strategy to secure a water source.”71 These economically induced 
changes strengthened Singapore’s security position and facilitated increased flexibility in 
the evolution of military strategy, contributing to the shift to the Dolphin.  
Economic growth also influenced changes in economic conditions for Singapore 
in various other ways. From the 1990s, regional economic growth contributed to evolving 
operating conditions, which posed serious challenges to the Porcupine strategy. In 
particular, the effects of “rapid urbanization”72 in the Malaysian state of Johor, from 
which Singapore purchased the majority of its water supply, combined with the 
modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) complicated the SAF’s ability to 
swiftly and decisively capture military objectives in a direct manner, a plan central to the 
Porcupine strategy. Another unintended outcome of the changing economic conditions 
was the creation of manpower constraints, which exacerbated the “SAF’s need to exploit 
modern military technology.”73 To overcome the challenges of the new operating 
conditions, maintain an overwhelming superiority over potential adversaries in the 
region, and resolve manpower constraints in the SAF, Singapore adopted the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) approach for the SAF. Yet, the SAF’s technological 
advancement and capability upgrades would “require radically different modus operandi 
for their effects to be maximized,”74 thus driving the shift in military strategy to the 
Dolphin. 
(3) Change of International Norms and Expectations 
As a driving force for the shift to the Dolphin strategy, the change in international 
norms and expectations was not as influential as the two preceding factors discussed. 
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Analysts agree that its impact, however, was still significant. Benson Chian argues that 
by the 1990s, there was an “increasing social and international expectation of military 
involvement in delivering humanitarian assistance,”75 and Singapore’s leaders were keen 
to assure international partners that Singapore “contribute[s] not in words but in deeds.”76 
See Seng Tan asserts that there was a growing view among Singapore’s leadership that 
“SAF’s usefulness is not defined solely in terms of deterrence against external attack but 
equally that of creating international space for Singapore and ensuring for itself freedom 
of manoeuver.”77 In addition, Singapore’s leadership understood that in order for the 
island-state to continue thriving and also to benefit from international cooperation and 
protection, Singapore needed to contribute as a “responsible stakeholder and not [behave] 
as a free rider.”78 The Porcupine strategy was not designed to support Singapore’s 
desired role as a “responsible member of the international community,”79 thus facilitating 
the shift to the Dolphin strategy. 
D. KEY ASSESSMENTS AND CRITIQUES 
In reviewing the literature, two observations stand out. First, two factors—
namely, “changing security environment” and “economic growth”—were consistent in 
driving both changes, with the latter playing an increasing role in the shift to the Dolphin. 
In the second shift, “changing international norms and expectations” also contributed to 
the change, but it was notably not a factor for the shift from Poisonous Shrimp to 
Dolphin. The first change in strategy was arguably less drastic than the second; it 
exhibited the characteristics of an escalation in aggression capabilities to enhance 
deterrence to similar threats, albeit in a deteriorated security environment. In fact, Pak 
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Shun Ng critically analyzes the first shift in Singapore’s military strategy and raises 
doubts about whether, besides the new name, substantive change in strategy actually 
occurred. To Ng, the change to Porcupine, which was marked by an official government 
announcement, was merely rhetorical. He asserts that it “took place because the SAF, 
backed with the timely maturity of Singapore’s military capability and its indigenous 
military planning capacity, could credibly convince both Singaporeans and foreigners of 
Singapore’s true defense posture to improve its stature through a public 
announcement.”80 By contrast, this author and the majority of scholars contend that the 
official announcement marked a substantive and necessary shift in military strategy, as is 
discussed in Chapter II. 
Second, all analysts acknowledged the importance of economic growth in the 
evolution process; however, most underplayed the influence that economic considerations 
had in the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy. Most scholars focused their 
arguments on how economic growth supported capability development, rather than how it 
triggered change itself. This literature review, however, has revealed that besides 
financing the change, economic factors have featured prominently as one of the key 
drivers for change in Singapore’s military strategy, especially from the Porcupine to the 
Dolphin.  
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
The literature review revealed various reasons that scholars have attributed to the 
evolution of military strategy in Singapore; however, on their own, they do not paint the 
full picture. Deeper analyses revealed two underlying driving forces, under which the 
individual reasons identified can be grouped. They lead to the following two hypotheses.  
Hypothesis One: Changing security environment was the underlying driving force 
for the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy. This hypothesis asserts that the 
Porcupine and Dolphin strategy were responses to changes in security environment; from 
the literature reviewed, this is also the predominant view amongst scholars in this field.  
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Hypothesis Two: Economic growth was the underlying driving force for the 
evolution of Singapore’s military strategy. This hypothesis asserts that economic growth 
drove both shifts through indirect and direct means, and particularly as a direct cause of 
change in the second shift as Singapore became more integrated into the global economy. 
Singapore’s rapid economic development funded military capability development, created 
the conditions for societal challenges, and shaped national interests, affecting Singapore’s 
security environment and how its leaders perceived existing threats could be managed. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis takes a historical analysis approach, studying each shift as a unique 
case study. The key characteristics of the Porcupine and Dolphin are assumed to reflect 
the prevailing conditions prior to each respective change. Studying each change as a 
separate case study facilitates the assessment of whether the changes are unique to each 
stage or are continuations across the time period. This paper primarily consults scholarly 
secondary sources for their informed analysis, and also for the purpose of consolidation 
and review of existing explanations of change. Military publications and journals articles 
contributed by military scholars, such as POINTER, are also utilized for additional 
insights. For official data and officially announced government positions to back up any 
claims made in this paper, official government websites are used. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The aim of the thesis is to identify the most compelling reason(s) for the two 
shifts in Singapore’s military strategy. Chapter II analyzes the first shift, from Poisonous 
Shrimp to Porcupine. It explores the dynamics by which change of security environment 
and change of economic conditions interplayed to drive the first shift. Chapter III 
addresses how the effects of the changes in security environment, economic conditions, 
and to a lesser extent, international norms and expectations combined to make the second 
shift, from Porcupine to Dolphin, compelling. Finally, Chapter IV concludes by 
summarizing the findings, showing how the evidence supports the thesis’ conclusion. It 
also compares both shifts and highlights observed trends and their implications, and it 
ends by offering an analysis of a potential third shift. 
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II. THE FIRST SHIFT: FROM POISONOUS SHRIMP TO 
PORCUPINE 
Chapter II analyzes the first of two shifts in Singapore’s military strategy, from 
the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine. This chapter’s objective is to test the two 
hypotheses highlighted in Chapter I; it also evaluates the relative impact of the two key 
factors—change of security environment and change of economic conditions. This 
chapter highlights how they contributed to making the shift necessary. Though both key 
factors combined to achieve the eventual outcome, changes in security environment 
played the more influential role in driving the first shift in Singapore’s military strategy, 
primarily because the country’s economic potential was not sufficiently realized to have a 
more direct impact. To support this argument, this chapter has been organized into four 
sections. Section A provides the background on how and why the Poisonous Shrimp 
strategy came to exist the way it did, setting the context for analysis and comparison in 
the subsequent sections. Section B discusses the declaration of the first shift and makes 
the case that it is indeed substantial and necessary. Section C then details the changes to 
Singapore’s security environment and economic conditions that made the shift to the 
Porcupine strategy inevitable, arguing in the process that changes to security environment 
played the greater role. Finally, Section D provides a chapter summary. 
A. BACKGROUND  
The conditions and strategic concerns that the Singaporean leadership faced in the 
years leading to and immediately after independence in 1965 were key in shaping the 
characteristics of the Poisonous Shrimp strategy. Understanding these conditions and 
concerns enables a better appreciation of why Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) 
leadership believed the subsequent shift to the Porcupine strategy was required.  
The British played a key role in developing pre-independence Singapore, 
providing the necessary protection, stability, and infrastructure to support the island-
state’s important entrepôt role for the empire; Singapore’s own economic development 
under the British, however, was limited. According to Jon Quah, “When Singapore 
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attained self-government [in 1959] after nearly 140 years of British colonial rule, it had a 
population of 1.58 million that was growing at the rate of 4 percent annually, an economy 
based on entrepôt trade, and an unemployment rate of 5 percent.”81 In 1960, Singapore’s 
per capita Gross National Product (GNP) “was only S$1,330 or US$443,”82 and shared 
the “classic features of a developing country.”83 After independence, the young nation 
continued to face economic uncertainty. Not only were Singapore’s markets still 
integrated and dependent on Malaysia’s, they now faced stiff competition from Malaysia 
and other emerging regional economies as well. The complete withdrawal of British 
troops by the early 1970s also led to the “loss of 40,000 jobs and a fifth of Singapore’s 
national income.”84 In addition, with a population of an “immigrant and multi-racial 
nature,”85 Singapore’s leadership placed great emphasis on nation building, an objective 
made more challenging by the threats of communism and communalism; the PAP 
leadership was convinced that economic conditions had to be drastically and 
expeditiously improved to counter the appeal of these two threats, and to “enhance the 
citizens’ commitment to Singapore.”86 As such, from the onset of independence, great 
emphasis and resources were poured into growing Singapore’s economy.  
The difficulties of nation building and economic growth, however, were not the 
only challenges the young nation faced in its formative years. Besides having to quash 
the domestic violence incited by communism and communalism, Singapore’s leadership 
was also burdened with the obsession of overcoming inherent vulnerabilities and 
defending the young island-state against external attacks. Furthermore, Huxley asserts 
that it was never the intention of the PAP to “take responsibility for the city-state’s 
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defense,”87 preferring for the role to be undertaken “by the Malaysian federal armed 
forces … and by a continuing major British military presence.”88 The unexpected 
expulsion from Malaysia in 1965, however, and the sudden announcement of British 
withdrawal in 1967 drastically derailed the initial plans of the PAP leadership.89 
According to See Seng Tan, Singapore then had “only two infantry battalions, two ships, 
no air force and no martial tradition to boot.”90 The security vacuum created by the 
departure of the British, combined with bilateral and regional tensions in the 1960s and 
1970s amplified Singapore’s sense of vulnerability to external threats, in particular, from 
its larger neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia.91 In addition, “Singapore had just emerged 
from Confrontation with Indonesia, which lasted from 1963 to 1966,”92 and the 
memories were still fresh in the minds of the nation’s leadership and population alike. 
Such fears contributed significantly in creating a “siege mentality”93 that was key in 
shaping the Poisonous Shrimp strategy, and this mentality would remain influential even 
up to the 1990s.  
Singapore, at independence, was in dire straits and desperate for a quick but 
effective solution to its security problems. It was thus against this grim backdrop of 
hostile neighbors, resource constraints, and the urgency to set up a credible and deterrent 
SAF from scratch that the Poisonous Shrimp strategy was developed. It was designed 
with the modest ambition “to provide for Singapore’s basic defense”94 and deter direct 
aggression by its hostile neighbors (Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Indonesia). 
Singapore’s ambitions to provide for its own security, however, did not stay modest for 
long.  
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B. DECLARING THE FIRST SHIFT 
By the late 1970s, both Singapore’s economy and military grew in strength, but 
the nation still could not overcome its sense of insecurity. Up to that point, the Poisonous 
Shrimp strategy had served its purpose in deterring invasion; however, its limitations as a 
strategy were quickly becoming more apparent as Singapore progressed. This was an 
issue that the nation’s leadership was eager to address. In 1982, Singapore’s current 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in the capacity then as the SAF’s Chief of Staff 
(General Staff), “[d]eclared [in a public speech,] the need for Singapore to shed the 
[defeatist] ‘Poisonous Shrimp’ image and build its military to survive any attack.”95 Such 
a declaration was widely viewed by analysts to signal the shift to the Porcupine strategy, 
which was designed to enhance survivability and better address the island-state’s 
evolving security concerns; scholars, however, were not unanimous in their views about 
the shift. Although the majority of scholars agree that this declaration marked a 
substantive and necessary shift in military strategy, analysts like Pak Shun Ng, assert that 
the shift remained rhetorical.  
This thesis compared the Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine and found that the 
key characteristics of both strategies reflect the different circumstances that influenced 
their respective designs; what the Poisonous Shrimp strategy could not solve became new 
requirements that influenced the design of the Porcupine, namely: the need to take pre-
emptive action, the need to create strategic depth, and the need for stronger deterrence. 
Specifically, the Porcupine strategy was designed to achieve more credible deterrence 
through power projection and preemptive strikes, and this in turn influenced the SAF’s 
focus on superior air force and armor capabilities rather than on further strengthening of 
the army.  
The following paragraphs provide evidence that the Porcupine strategy was 
shaped by specific requirements that the Poisonous Shrimp could not cater to, thus 
serving two purposes. First they support the argument that the shift from the Poisonous 
Shrimp to the Porcupine was both substantive and necessary. Second, because the nature 
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of the evidence presented in the following sub-sections is directly related to the changing 
security environment, it supports this chapter’s argument that changes in security 
environment was the more significant of the two key factors driving the first shift. 
a. Need to Take Pre-emptive Action 
Singapore depended heavily on Malaysia for a majority of its water supply, and 
because of the prickly bilateral relations with Malaysia, the island-state developed 
paranoia over having “its water supply cut off.”96 Singapore’s leadership was determined 
to secure water resources at all costs, and that meant by force if necessary. To achieve 
this objective, pre-emptive action would be required, but the defense-oriented Poisonous 
Shrimp strategy was not designed for pre-emption. Shang-Su Wu supports this 
assessment, asserting that, “After the British withdrawal, while the SAF had military 
superiority in armor and air power”97 over the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), the 
Poisonous Shrimp strategy made it difficult for Singapore to overcome Malaysian 
defense of the water sources in Johor—especially if Malaysia was given time to 
prepare.98 In any case, a strategy based on mere brute force would not have achieved the 
intended outcome of securing water resources with related infrastructure intact. The SAF 
then, though superior in comparison to the MAF, did not possess the required capabilities 
to strategically project forces and defeat the adversary in its own territory. Thus, it was 
evident that Singapore needed to adopt a more pre-emptive strategy, one that could 
“achieve a swift and decisive victory over aggressors,”99 and “give the aggressor a 
knock-out punch in round one.”100  
b. Need to Create Strategic Depth 
Singapore is a small island-state surrounded by geographically larger and 
politically more aggressive neighbors. Thus, it is extremely vulnerable to military 
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aggression, which can cause physical damage and economic disruptions, as well as 
spillover effects from regional social or political unrest. Through the Porcupine strategy, 
Singapore thus sought to create a physical buffer between itself and potential adversaries 
by projecting its military capabilities far beyond its shores, expanding its sphere of 
influence and thus creating strategic depth. The rise in sub-regional tensions as well as 
extra-regional threats to Singapore and its Southeast Asian counterparts in the 1970s 
reinforced this requirement. Huxley advocates this view, explaining that Singapore’s 
leaders understood that the island-state’s “extremely small land area means that the 
republic has no territorial strategic depth: it cannot yield territory to an aggressor with the 
expectation of later regaining it.”101 In addition, memories of Singapore’s swift defeat by 
the Japanese advancing from the north during WWII were still fresh in the minds of its 
nation’s leaders. As such, there was a firm belief that “effective protection [of Singapore] 
from landward attack is only possible by in-depth defense of Johor and the Malayan 
peninsula … [because] from Johor, an enemy could cut water and food supplies and shell 
Singapore into submission.”102 Andrew Tan, Raska, and Loo agree that the focus on 
“creating strategic depth to protect the island from direct enemy fire, and moving the 
forward edge of the battle area in order to secure Singapore’s water supplies sources from 
southern parts of Malaysia,”103 had essentially “driven the evolution”104 toward the 
Porcupine becoming “a strategy of Forward Defense.”105  
c. Need for Stronger Deterrence 
In the years leading up to the early 1980s, bilateral tensions between Singapore 
and its immediate neighbors, “particularly Malaysia, which tended to use the former as a 
convenient political scapegoat for domestic problems,”106 consistently threatened the 
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island-state’s “economic and social stability.”107 Disagreements with Malaysia often 
involved the larger state threatening to cut water supplies or changing previously agreed-
upon terms. In some cases, Malaysia even brandished threats of war. Such actions 
reinforced the idea that “the poisonous shrimp strategy was deficient in that it offered 
Singapore merely a choice of suicide or surrender because of its implication that the SAF 
would fight an ultimately unwinnable war on its own territory.”108 Although Singapore 
was never attacked militarily, its Poisonous Shrimp strategy did little to deter the nation-
state’s larger neighbors from occasional attempts at influencing its domestic and foreign 
policies.  
Malaysia and Indonesia tended to view Singapore as the “younger sibling” in the 
three-sided relationship. Regardless of the island-state’s development leading up to the 
1980s, these neighboring countries expected Singapore’s actions and policies to reflect 
that hierarchical position. However, Singapore, led by then ambitious and steel-willed 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, refused to submit to political bullying. Resolving 
disagreements through compromise and peaceful negotiations remained important, but 
Singapore’s leadership firmly believed that fruitful negotiations were impossible if they 
were not “backed up by real military strength”109 and the resolve to use it when required. 
Singapore’s leaders believed that “such a provocative and tough military posture would 
constitute an effective deterrent to potential adversaries.”110 Singapore sought to convey 
“the message: I may not completely destroy you, but you will have to pay a high price for 
trying to subdue me, and [even then] you may still not succeed.”111 The Porcupine 
strategy was thus designed to achieve stronger deterrence, backed by the 2G SAF, which 
was substantially superior to neighboring armed forces on the land, the air, and the sea.  
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C. EXPLAINING THE SHIFT  
The leaders who designed the Poisonous Shrimp strategy were influenced by the 
events that occurred before and immediately after Singapore’s independence. At the same 
time, limited resources and time also meant that the objectives of the Poisonous Shrimp 
strategy had to be kept modest. By the 1970s, however, it became clear that the 
Poisonous Shrimp strategy was inadequate in ensuring Singapore’s national interests. 
This can be attributed to two key factors: change of security environment and change of 
economic conditions. 
1. Change of Security Environment 
In the shift from the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine, two key factors 
contributed to the change of security environment, namely: deterioration of sub-regional 
relations and emerging regional and extra-regional threats. 
a. Deterioration of Sub-Regional Relations 
Since independence, a key challenge for Singapore’s leadership was to manage 
the relationships with the nation’s two closest neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Singapore-Malaysia relations were comparatively more tumultuous and thus had a greater 
influence on Singapore’s military strategy. The separation agreement between Malaysia 
and Singapore deliberately included provisions to promote “continuing extremely close 
bilateral defense links but, in practice, such ties did not endure for long after 
separation.”112 In 1972, the British withdrew their troops from the region and 
relinquished responsibility of Singapore and Malaysia. Without the British as the neutral 
arbitrator, water became increasingly “used as political leverage by Malaysia”113 against 
Singapore, even though water agreements were meant to be “honored under the 1965 
Separation Act between Singapore and Malaysia, and lodged with the United 
Nations.”114 Huxley asserts that by the mid-1970s, it became apparent that “The 
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Federation intended to make life difficult for Singapore.”115 Recounting the tumultuous 
relationship with Malaysia in the earlier decades of his premiership, then Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew claimed in the 1990s: “The Malaysian leaders thought they could station 
troops in Singapore, squat on us and if necessary close the causeway and cut off our 
water supply.”116 In addition, territorial disputes and disagreements over strategic 
concerns such as Pedra Branca often led to Malaysia brandishing threats of war.117 Due 
to the Poisonous Shrimp strategy’s generic focus on basic defense, its approach to 
deterrence was non-directional and thus had limited effect. As the Singapore-Malaysia 
relationship deteriorated, it became clear that any changes to Singapore’s military 
strategy would have to cater more specifically to countering the threat from up north. 
Besides the challenge of deterring invasion, Singapore also faced challenges to its 
sovereignty. As a newly independent nation, Singapore struggled to establish 
maneuvering space to exercise her sovereignty and freely make political decisions among 
her larger and more assertive sub-regional neighbors without offending them. In a speech 
in 2015, Bilahari Kausikan recounted Singapore’s tense relations with Malaysia and 
Indonesia, saying:  
The basic issue in Singapore’s relations with our neighbors is existential: 
the implicit challenge that by its very existence a Chinese majority 
Singapore organized on the basis of multiracial meritocracy poses to 
systems organized on the basis of different and ultimately irreconcilable 
principles. That we have the temerity to be successful, adds to the 
offence.118  
In addition, Tan asserts that “Singapore’s military build-up [post-independence], 
in particular its choice of Israel as a model, was greeted initially with hostility in 
Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia.”119 This hostility was sometimes expressed 
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through “rhetorical assaults by Malaysian and Indonesian political leaders over such 
issues as airspace infringement and perceived lack of sensitivity on the part of 
Singapore’s leaders.”120 Occasionally, these neighboring political leaders would leverage 
on the island-state’s vulnerabilities to “influence independent Singapore’s foreign 
policy,”121 infringing on its sovereignty. It became clear to Singapore’s leaders that the 
nation’s existence as a sovereign state was not threatened by invasion alone. If Singapore 
was to survive and prosper, it needed a new strategy that could not only continue to deter 
invasion but also could “deter military, political, or economic pressure from regional 
states.”122 The Poisonous Shrimp strategy, with its focus on basic defense and deterring 
invasion alone, was too passive to achieve this new requirement.  
b. Emerging Regional and Extra-Regional Threats 
Singapore’s security environment was also affected by the tensions from the 
wider Southeast Asian region and beyond. Andrew Tan describes the 1970s as a period of 
“heightened political instability”123 in Southeast Asia, characterized by “changed 
geopolitical realities”124 especially after the Vietnam War. The failure of a superpower 
like the Unites States to prevent the communist victory in South Vietnam exacerbated the 
sense of uncertainty among regional states. Although internal security threats posed by 
communism in Singapore during the 1970s were diminished, the threat of external 
communist influences spreading among the majority-Chinese Singaporean population 
still existed, and it was still taken very seriously by the nation’s leadership.125 Besides the 
spread of the ideology, fears that communist attacks originating from Indochina would be 
conducted on the rest of Southeast Asia caused concerned regional states to take 
individual precautionary measures by strengthening their respective armed forces and 
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revising military strategies.126 In addition, Singapore’s leaders were wary of “certain 
external powers making unwelcomed moves into Southeast Asia.”127 In particular, Soviet 
aircraft activity out of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam reinforced these fears and exacerbated 
concerns for regional security, which would have an impact on Singapore as well.128 
Lacking strategic depth, Singapore was thus forced to consider expanding the reach of its 
military forces and even intervening in defense of Thailand and Malaysia in the event of 
Soviet endorsed communist attacks deployed from Vietnam.129 In addition, Singapore’s 
leadership was adamant that Soviet maritime ambition in the region was best “matched 
by an American naval presence”130 and thus sought policies that supported U.S. maritime 
interests in Southeast Asia. The Poisonous Shrimp was primarily a land-based strategy 
with limited reach, and thus to cater to these new priorities, Singapore sought a new 
military strategy that enabled it to extend its military influence beyond its shores. 
As maritime trade began to grow in importance in the late 1970s, extra-regional 
navies also sought to expand their influence in Southeast Asia, adding to Singapore’s 
security challenges. Countries like China and other “second-tier extra regional 
powers”131 such as India, Australia, and Japan were “suspected of having regional 
ambitions,”132 albeit limited ones. More significantly, they possessed the “naval 
wherewithal to influence regional maritime policy”133 and thus were viewed with 
caution. In contrast, the Southeast Asian navies, at that time, did not have the “capability 
to dictate the course of maritime events in the South China Sea,”134 and thus grew 
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increasingly concerned. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong echoed similar concerns about 
India and Japan in a speech as Defense Minister in 1989, not because he saw them as 
immediate threats to Singapore or Southeast Asia, “but because their actions show that 
they clearly do not consider amicable regional relations the inevitable consequence of a 
global trend.”135 Due to the unpredictable nature of Southeast Asian politics, Singapore 
would “have to be prepared.”136 As such, in response to Singapore’s changing “maritime 
geostrategic context,”137 the focus of Singapore’s security environment gradually 
expanded beyond the land to include “SLOC security, seaward defense, and international 
security.”138 The Poisonous Shrimp strategy, however, was designed with minimal 
attention on the maritime domain. Thus, the shift to the Porcupine strategy became a 
necessity.  
2. Change of Economic Conditions 
Compared to the changing security environment, economic factors played a less 
significant role in driving the shift from the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine strategy. 
Nonetheless, the change in economic conditions beginning in the 1970s did contribute to 
making the shift in military strategy more compelling. While still primarily playing a 
supporting role, the nation’s rapidly growing economy became increasingly important 
and thus began to warrant the attention of Singapore’s military planners. The shift to the 
Porcupine thus reflected the Singaporean leadership’s acknowledgement of the need to 
secure investor confidence and also of the increasing importance of the maritime domain. 
a. Securing Investor Confidence 
Singapore’s rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s was not only vital to 
the nation’s initial development, it was also key in fueling military spending and 
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contributed to the shift to the Porcupine strategy.139 Besides funding military capability 
development, Huxley asserts that globalization and rapid economic development made 
Singapore “vitally dependent on foreign investment.”140 To ensure Singapore’s economy 
continued to develop, the nation’s leadership understood the importance of securing 
investor confidence, and thus, the nation had to make changes to its military strategy to 
enhance its security and deterrence profile. Any “loss of confidence in the republic’s 
stability or security would seriously damage its economic health.”141 The defeatist nature 
of the Poisonous Shrimp strategy did not instill confidence and had to be replaced. Under 
this strategy, even if Singapore could be successfully defended from invasion, it would 
sustain damage that could cripple the nation’s economic infrastructure. To Huxley and 
Ng, a change to a stronger and more credible military strategy that could take the fight to 
the enemy and prevent damage to Singapore’s territory demonstrated the national 
leadership’s commitment for long-term security and stability. Thus, it could discourage 
“prospective foreign investors from pulling out their investments and transferring them to 
safer havens and instead make investors confident of Singapore’s economic potential.”142 
In addition, the PAP leadership was adamant that the island-state’s economy would not 
survive a prolonged war and thus sought a quick solution. A strong air force was 
therefore seen as the key to a swift and decisive victory. Due to ready technology and 
willing sellers, it was also convenient and practical for Singapore to build a formidable 
air force in a short timespan, albeit at a high cost. Singapore’s economic strength made 
this a viable option and thus contributed to the shift to the Porcupine.  
b. Increasing Maritime Importance 
Though an island-state, Singapore’s focus on the maritime domain did not 
develop until the 1980s. This was particularly surprising given Singapore’s “complete 
lack of natural resources and the continuing importance of its entrepôt role,”143 
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established during its colonial era, which resulted in the island-state’s “extreme 
dependency on the outside world.”144 Rapid economic growth beginning in the 1970s, 
however, compelled Singapore to pay more attention to the maritime domain. Heavy 
reliance on foreign trade and heavy investments in developing world-class port facilities 
further increased the importance of secure SLOCs and uninterrupted maritime trade to 
Singapore. The crippling of the island-state’s maritime linkages with the world was 
threatening not just to its economy but to its very existence as a sovereign state.145 
Unfortunately, due to Singapore’s geographical location, access to and from the “high 
seas, on which it depends for 85 percent of its trade,”146 are through Malaysian and 
Indonesian waters.147 There was thus a need for the RSN “not only to patrol Singapore’s 
immediate maritime locale more effectively, but also to project naval power further afield 
and to think in terms, for example, of protecting merchant vessels in the South China 
Sea.”148 Without a credible navy and strategy to protect Singapore’s maritime interests, 
the young nation would remain at the mercies of its two larger neighbors. The shift to the 
Porcupine strategy, which included a new maritime element not present in the Poisonous 
Shrimp, reflected these new concerns. 
D.  SUMMARY  
This chapter has argued that changes in Singapore’s security environment and 
economic conditions that took place from post-independence up to the early 1980s made 
the shift to the Porcupine both substantial and necessary. Of the two factors, changes in 
security environment—notably the deterioration of sub-regional relations and the 
emergence of regional and extra-regional threats—played the more significant role. 
These changes were unanticipated, and thus, they not only revealed the weaknesses of the 
Poisonous Shrimp strategy, they also derailed Singapore’s initial plans and caused a 
deviation from the original trajectory. The changes were reflected in the key 
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characteristics of the Porcupine, which in turn drove specific capability upgrades in the 
2G SAF. 
Changes in economic conditions also contributed in making the shift more 
compelling, albeit to a lesser extent. More significantly, the role that economic 
considerations played in driving the shift to the Porcupine strategy provides a clear 
indication of the integration of Singapore’s economic interests with its military strategy 
for the first time. As Singapore’s economy grew, and with more at stake, its leadership 
understood that the defeatist nature of the Poisonous Shrimp strategy was no longer 
acceptable to both its populace and foreign investors, paving the way for the Porcupine. 
In addition, Singapore’s strong economic position presented more options than the island-
state previously had. As such, even though the Army retained an important role as part of 
the Porcupine strategy, the RSAF benefited the most as it gave the SAF the capability of 
“preemptive”149 strikes and force projection if required. Inevitably, this also meant that 
under such circumstances, “the RSN was the funding ‘stepchild,’ which limited its 
procurements and operations.”150 The importance of the maritime domain and thus the 
RSN, however, would increase substantially in the shift to the Dolphin strategy. 
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III. THE SECOND SHIFT: FROM PORCUPINE TO DOLPHIN 
Chapter III analyzes the relative strengths of the two hypotheses articulated in 
Chapter I regarding the second shift in Singapore’s military strategy, from the Porcupine 
to the Dolphin. Similar to the first shift discussed in Chapter II, the conditions in the 
period preceding the shift to the Dolphin contributed to the changes and also shaped the 
corresponding key characteristics in the new strategy. The shift from the Porcupine to the 
Dolphin strategy, however, is more drastic than the first. Unlike the first shift, the second 
was driven by three key factors, instead of two. In addition to the changes in security 
environment and in economic conditions, we consider the change of international norms 
and expectations. Although the combination of these three key factors made the shift 
from the Porcupine to the Dolphin strategy necessary, changes in economic conditions 
played the most significant role. This was only possible because Singapore’s economy 
had matured significantly by the 1990s as a result of rapid and consistent economic 
growth. To support this argument, this chapter has been organized into three sections. 
Section A summarizes the key characteristics of the Dolphin strategy, facilitating analysis 
and comparison in the subsequent sections. Section B then explains how the three key 
factors drove the shift to the Dolphin strategy, and in the process, highlights how a 
change of economic conditions was the most significant factor. Finally, Section C 
summarizes the key arguments presented in the chapter. 
A. THE DOLPHIN STRATEGY—KEY CHARACTERISTICS  
Throughout its evolution, Singapore’s military strategy retained a strong focus on 
deterrence. As evident in the unique characteristics of the respective evolutionary stages, 
though, each shift sought to achieve deterrence differently. Thus, by examining the key 
features of the Dolphin strategy and what they were designed to achieve, we can discern 
the impact of the three key factors in driving the second shift; this facilitates the analysis 
and comparison done in Section B of this chapter.  
Though achieved in different ways, the Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine 
strategies both projected a prickly posture backed by the willingness to use brute force as 
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the primary means to deter potential attackers. The Dolphin, on the other hand, sought to 
deter in a way that better reflected Singapore’s development, wealth, and newfound 
international standing. This strategy phase embraces a softer and more diplomatic 
approach, focusing instead on spearheading regional initiatives that help to build shared 
awareness, regional confidence, and stronger relations. Singapore’s leaders also sought to 
reinforce this objective by contributing beyond the region and making Singapore relevant 
to the global community. The Dolphin strategy was thus designed with these 
considerations in mind. Notwithstanding its international contributions, the Dolphin 
strategy still retained a strong and potentially aggressive deterrent factor backed by the 
SAF’s technologically superior capabilities and “emphasis on swift and agile attacks 
upon its foes, much as dolphins are said to strike at sharks”151 when required. For these 
reasons, this thesis describes the Dolphin’s deterrence style as “preventive deterrence,” a 
term first introduced in Chapter I. 
Another distinct feature of the Dolphin strategy is its clear emphasis on protecting 
economic interests and on dealing with threats to sovereignty, security, and maritime 
trade. This approach reflects Singapore’s “growing dependence on long and vulnerable 
sea-lines of communications and strategic waterways to markets and energy 
resources”152 as its economy grew exponentially after the 1980s. As such, the RSAF 
remained an important element in the Dolphin strategy and continued to be the main 
beneficiary of the nation-state’s economic growth. The RSN also reaped the benefits of 
the increasing maritime focus in the Dolphin, which enabled the navy to procure 
submarines, Landing Ship Tanks, and stealth frigates to replace the aging fleet that had 
limited range, endurance, and attack capabilities. To Da Cunha, a good “evidence of the 
[increasing] maritime orientation”153 of Singapore’s military strategy beginning in the 
late 1990s is the procurement of maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, the 
reconfiguration of significant numbers of air force fighter interceptors and strike aircraft 
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to conduct maritime reconnaissance and anti-shipping operations,154 and the “acquisition 
of anti-ship missiles and associated target acquisition systems”155 to support the changing 
“roles [of RSAF fighter aircraft] from ground attack to that of sea strike.”156 Da Cunha 
also asserts that, “More significant, perhaps, has been the retrofitting of mid-air refueling 
probes onto these aircraft, giving them a substantial range to hit targets well out into the 
South China Sea [and the Straits of Malacca],”157 supporting the navy’s strategic shift 
from limited sea denial to sea control. These changes to the SAF’s capabilities to achieve 
full-spectrum dominance were driven in turn by the shift in military strategy, reflecting 
Singapore’s desire to extend its influence beyond the region, and also an increased 
maritime focus that came to characterize the Dolphin.  
B. EXPLAINING THE SHIFT  
As mentioned in the previous section, the Dolphin strategy was similar to its two 
preceding forms in that it retained a strong emphasis on deterrence. There were also, 
however, key differences that support the argument that the second shift was more drastic 
than the first. Three key reasons account for such an outcome: change of security 
environment, change of economic conditions, and to a lesser extent, change of 
international norms and expectations.  
1. Change of Security Environment 
In the shift to the Dolphin, changes in Singapore’s security environment can be 
attributed to three key factors: improvement of sub-regional relations, growth of regional 
navies, and emergence of non-conventional threats. These changes caused Singapore’s 
security focus to expand beyond traditional operating boundaries and threats.  
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a.  Improvement of Sub-Regional Relations 
Singapore’s relationship with its sub-regional neighbors has always been an 
important influence on how its leadership viewed the island-state’s security environment. 
Huxley asserts that beginning in the 1980s Malaysia and Indonesia shared a “fraternal 
coziness”158 and would occasionally lead them to “gang up” against Singapore. This sub-
regional dynamic reinforced the island-state’s preoccupation with the twin themes of 
survival and vulnerability, key concerns that the young nation’s leadership believed were 
best countered through the strong army and lethal air force that characterized the 
Porcupine strategy. By the 1990s, however, “there had been a fundamental realignment in 
the triangular relationship between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.”159 Shang-Su 
Wu and Huxley highlight that the bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia 
gradually improved after Lee Kuan Yew (1990) and Mahathir Mohamad (2003) stepped 
down as prime ministers of their respective states. In addition, “after Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono took over the Presidency [in 2004], the cooperation between the two 
countries [Singapore and Indonesia] continued to strengthen across the arenas of anti-
crime, economic, and defense.”160 The changes in key leaderships in the three sub-
regional neighbors thus paved the way for improved relations and increased cooperation. 
Improved sub-regional relations, bolstered by strong economic growth in the 
1990s, created an atmosphere of stability and cooperation among the three Southeast 
Asian neighbors. This afforded Singapore the capacity and flexibility to consider 
implementing changes to its military strategy. Wu supports this assessment and also 
highlights a corresponding shift in the focus and structure of the SAF in tandem with the 
shift Dolphin strategy. He asserts that Singapore’s initial focus was “on land offense 
performed by the army and air force, [primarily] to preserve its water source [and deter 
invasion], and this strategic plan is reflected in the structure of the SAF prior to the 
2000s.”161 Resulting from the improvement of sub-regional relations and increasing 
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importance of maritime trade, Singapore’s military capability development and strategy, 
post 2000s, developed in a way that reflected the island-state’s “concerns with onshore 
and maritime defense at the same time as the navy was gradually strengthening.”162 
Military capability development, however, has proceeded in a “judicious, moderated, and 
incremental”163 manner to prevent triggering a naval arms race.  
Despite the general improvement of relations with its immediate neighbors, 
Singapore’s leaders remained guarded against potential acts of aggression as sub-regional 
relations were unpredictable and susceptible to sudden downturns. For example, in 1991 
against the general uptrend in sub-regional relations, Singapore’s two larger neighbors 
conducted the “largest ever Malaysian-Indonesian bilateral military exercise, Malindo 
Darsasa 3AB”164 in Johor on Singapore’s National Day. The exercise simulated a 
combined invasion scenario and put the SAF on high alert. Though no conflict ensued, 
such random acts of aggression served to justify the realist sentiments among the PAP 
leadership and reinforced its commitment to ensure that active deterrence remained a 
vital element of Singapore’s military strategy despite planned changes.165 As such, while 
improved sub-regional relations facilitated the shift to a new military strategy, ensuring 
the SAF’s military superiority over neighboring militaries has remained a national 
priority. These factors influenced the characteristics of the Dolphin strategy, which has 
focused on cooperation but retains a strong emphasis on military might for deterrence.  
b. Growth of Regional Navies 
The improvement in sub-regional relations coincided with regional economic 
growth and the rising importance of the maritime domain, causing Singapore’s Southeast 
Asian neighbors to also begin investing in their respective navies. The growth of regional 
navies and the strategic importance of secure SLOCs to Singapore meant that the RSN’s 
previous role of limited sea denial in the Porcupine strategy would prove to be inadequate 
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moving forward. According to Da Cunha, the key element of “Singapore’s strategy aims 
not at defeating threats but at preventing them from emerging,”166 but still, Singapore’s 
leaders left nothing to chance. As such, while the global strategic importance of the sea 
routes surrounding Singapore meant that the successful “interdiction by hostile powers or 
neighbors, which could mine its approaches or blockade it into submission”167 was 
considered relatively remote, since it would infuriate other affected maritime 
stakeholders, Singapore’s leaders have remained adamant that a vastly superior SAF 
centered on an RSN capable of force projection and sea control would be instrumental in 
preventing potential adversaries (primarily Malaysia and to a lesser extent, Indonesia) 
from even harboring such intentions in the first place.168  
Even as regional navies have grown, there has been a conscious effort among all 
regional stakeholders to preserve the peace and stability for continued economic 
development. As such, Singapore has sought to develop a more effective way to enhance 
national objectives in a way that displays the SAF’s operational readiness and deterrence 
in a non-aggressive manner, a task the Porcupine strategy could not achieve. In addition, 
to further improve relations with its Muslim neighbors, there has been a conscious effort 
on Singapore’s part to shed its image as the “Israel of Southeast Asia.”169 Bilahari 
Kausikan reiterated this position in a speech in 2015 saying: “Mr Lee [Kuan Yew] also 
once told an Israeli General who had helped start our armed forces that Singapore had 
learnt two things from Israel: how to be strong, and how not to use our strength; meaning 
that it is necessary to get along with neighbors and no country can live in perpetual 
conflict with its neighbors.”170 Such a mentality supports the shift to the Dolphin 
strategy, which was designed to not only enable better deterrence and defense against 
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evolving threats but also to promote confidence and cooperation among Singapore’s 
neighbors as well.171  
c. Emergence of Non-Conventional Threats  
Up to the 1990s, Singapore’s security environment had been largely shaped by 
conventional threats; however, “post-9/11, there was a shift in the [regional and 
international] security landscape, which widened to include non-conventional threats 
such as terrorism and piracy.”172 As such, even though the Porcupine era was 
characterized by improving sub-regional relations and reduced conventional threats to 
Singapore, the emergence of non-conventional threats contributed to a new security 
environment that was later described as “troubled peace.”173 Over time, this condition of 
troubled peace gradually became accepted by Singapore’s leadership as the “new normal 
in our globalized world.”174 Analysts thus agree that “Singapore’s [increasingly] 
unpredictable strategic environment”175 necessitated a change in military strategy in 
anticipation of different and newer types of threats, of which terrorism is considered the 
most dangerous due to its potential to cripple the economy and cause damage directly on 
Singapore soil. Wu argues that Singapore’s “stable international status”176 and its 
position as an international financial and travel hub have made it an attractive target for 
terrorist attacks. Allowing any terrorist attacks to be successfully conducted on Singapore 
soil, however, would be detrimental to the country’s economy and thus its survival. Such 
threats placed direct pressures on Singapore’s strategic planners to integrate the 
protection of the country’s economic infrastructures and interests with its military 
strategy. To Wu, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 proved that threats from 
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terrorism could “be as destructive as conventional military threats,”177 and that Singapore 
was becoming increasingly susceptible as a potential target “due to it being surrounded 
by Islamic countries as well as the close relations it held with the USA; for example, its 
support for the war on terror.”178 In addition, Singapore’s Muslim neighbors were now a 
source of not only potential conventional threats but non-conventional threats as well. As 
such, these new challenges drastically complicated and altered the strategic security 
environment for Singapore. The Porcupine strategy did not cater for such security 
dynamics and thus needed to be replaced. 
As a maritime nation, home to the world’s second busiest port,179 and 
strategically located along the seaward approaches to and from the South China Sea and 
the Straits of Malacca, Singapore has always been dependent on seaborne trade. By the 
early 1990s, however, this dependency on the maritime domain grew exponentially. The 
peace and stability of the post-Cold War era coincided with the “growth of the global-
interlinked economy,”180 leading to a significant increase in the volume of global 
seaborne trade. Thus, there has been an increased dependency of Singapore and the other 
“export-dependent economies in the [Southeast Asian] region”181 on secure SLOCs and 
uninterrupted maritime commerce. The growth of the global maritime trade, however, has 
not been without challenges for Southeast Asia. Andrew Tan asserts that, “piracy in the 
Straits of Malacca and in Indonesian waters reached crisis levels in 1990s as the region 
recorded the world’s highest incidences of piracy at that time.”182 To add to the 
problems, the sudden slew of terrorist attacks in the early 2000s caused “heightened fears 
of a terrorism-piracy nexus that could lead to a devastating maritime terrorist attack.”183 
Successful maritime-related terrorist acts such as the attack on USS Cole in Yemen and 
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the Sipadan hostage crisis in 2000; the bombing of the French tanker, Lindberg, off the 
coast of Yemen in 2002; and the bombing of the SuperFerry in the Philippines in 2004 
intensified fears that terrorist groups would leverage on the maritime expertise of regional 
pirates to conduct seaborne attacks in Southeast Asia.184 The Porcupine strategy was 
inadequate in managing these emerging non-conventional maritime threats, which put 
Singapore’s economic interests at risk as well, exacerbating the island-state’s security 
concerns moving forward, and adding pressure for a new strategy that could address these 
new threats. 
The Porcupine was designed to deal with specific conventional threats that were 
primarily land based in nature, and thus it quickly became obvious to Singapore’s leaders 
that the strategy was unsuitable to deal effectively with the complexity and increasingly 
maritime nature of the threats that were emerging. As much as maritime trade was 
important to Singapore, the nation’s leaders understood that it was vital to the global 
economy as well. As such, the failure to ensure the security of the sea routes in Southeast 
Asia, especially the Straits of Malacca, could potentially result in regional and global 
economic disruptions and therefore “strengthen the temptation of external actors to 
intervene,”185 impeding on Singapore’s sovereignty. The need for a new strategy was 
“emphasized by the fact that Japan, [in early 2000,] proposed to dispatch its own vessels 
together with units from the People’s Republic of China and South Korea to support”186 
security patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Adamant that the Southeast Asian region should 
not be dependent on extra-regional powers for its own security, Singapore’s leadership 
took active steps to lead initiatives for regional security cooperation and information 
sharing, thus facilitating the transition to the Dolphin strategy. 
Unlike conventional adversaries that possess known territories and capabilities, 
terrorists and pirates are difficult to deter, detect, and eradicate effectively; the Porcupine 
strategy certainly could not. To deal with the new security environment at home and 
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abroad, a new military strategy was required, one that was more capable in dealing with 
the increasing maritime nature of Singapore’s emerging threats. Furthermore, the new 
strategy must be centered on an SAF that was equipped with network-centric capabilities 
that would enable it to tap the expertise and resources of other national agencies in a 
“Whole-of-Government approach.”187 This became an important feature of the Dolphin 
strategy. Singapore’s leadership was also cognizant that the threats posed by terrorism 
and piracy could not be curtailed by Singapore alone; therefore, while self-reliant 
deterrence remained important to Singapore’s strategic planners, there was a deliberate 
effort to ensure that the Dolphin strategy was designed to encourage cooperation, 
confidence, and information sharing among regional and international partners. This was 
important as, prior to the 2000s, official arrangements for coordinated patrols and 
information sharing between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore were almost non-
existent. 
2. Change of Economic Conditions 
By the early 2000s, Singapore’s economy had become integral to the nation’s 
continued existence as a sovereign state. With more at stake, Singapore’s economic 
interests, both domestically and internationally, thus warranted greater protection and 
attention from its national leaders and strategic planners alike. As such, compared to the 
shift to the Porcupine strategy where economic factors served mainly as an enabling 
force, the change of economic conditions played a significantly larger and more direct 
role in driving the shift to the Dolphin strategy. Five key factors account for this change: 
consistent economic growth, reduced dependencies, evolved operating conditions, 
increasing manpower constraints, and technological and structural challenges. 
a. Consistent Economic Growth 
As Singapore developed and became wealthier as an outcome of consistent 
economic growth, the idea of military conflict, regardless of its magnitude or length, 
became increasingly unpalatable to the nation’s leaders and citizens alike due to the 
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expected damage to its economy. In addition, the interdependency that Singapore shared 
with its neighbors “given the largely complementary nature of their economies”188 would 
make it even more difficult to recover from the aftermath of any wars in the sub-region. 
Andrew Tan adds that Singapore’s leaders understood that “any pre-emptive attack by 
Singapore could mean all-out war with its neighbors, as well as crippling international 
sanctions should Singapore even attempt to occupy any neighboring territory.”189 Thus, 
as Singapore continued to benefit from regional peace and prosperity, the aggressively 
deterrent Porcupine strategy gradually lost its appeal, and the nation’s leaders had to seek 
a different approach, reinforcing the assessment that economic considerations were 
becoming increasingly influential in shaping Singapore’s military strategy. 
Besides contributing directly as a factor in driving the shift, Singapore’s 
consistent economic performance was also instrumental in financing the development and 
upgrade of the SAF’s capabilities that were central to the Dolphin strategy. Supporting 
this assessment, Wu asserts that a “series of incidents, such as the regional financial crisis 
in 1997, the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001, and the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003”190 threatened to derail the SAF’s force 
modernization efforts to actualize the Dolphin strategy. Singapore’s consistent economic 
growth, however, ensured that the plans stayed on track. The RSN, in particular, 
benefited considerably from this consistent growth; despite the economic downturn and 
the high costs of naval programs, Singapore was still able to push through its naval 
buildup unhindered, enabling the RSN to feature prominently as part of the Dolphin 
strategy in the 2000s. 
b. Reduced Dependencies 
As Singapore lacked natural resources and land for farming, it had been 
dependent on Malaysia for the majority of commodities required for survival since the 
colonial era. Benefiting from its strong economy beginning in the 1980s, Singapore was 
                                                 
188 Tan, “Singapore’s Defense: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications,” 455–456. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Wu, The Defense Capabilities of Small States, 52. 
 48
able to take deliberate steps to reduce its vulnerabilities, notably by minimizing the city-
state’s dependency on Malaysia for water and food. Singapore began purchasing 
“alternative supplies”191 from Indonesia and Thailand as well. In addition, economic 
growth financed research, the development of technology, and “construction of 
desalination and water recycling plants.”192 By the late 1990s, Singapore’s investments in 
renewable water technologies had paid off. Wu argues that, “The diminution or 
elimination of the dependency on Malaysia for water could lower or defuse any motive 
for an offensive strategy to secure a water source.”193 Indeed, Singapore’s reduced 
dependency on Malaysia for water thus meant that the SAF no longer needed to prioritize 
force projection into Malaysia to secure water sources in the event of war. This 
development strengthened Singapore’s security position and also facilitated increased 
flexibility in the use of its defense budget and in the evolution of its military strategy. The 
focus now shifted away from the land battle to reflect the growing importance of the 
maritime domain in the Dolphin strategy.  
c. Evolved Operating Conditions 
Singapore was not the only country in the region to benefit from improving 
economic conditions. From the late 1980s onwards, the economic growth experienced in 
Southeast Asia not only contributed to Singapore’s improved relations with its immediate 
neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, it also funded regional development in infrastructure 
and military capabilities, posing new challenges to the Porcupine strategy in the process. 
From the 1990s, boosted by a strong economy, many Singaporeans began to invest in 
property and businesses in the Malaysian state of Johor, from which Singapore purchased 
the majority of its water supply, fueling “rapid urbanization.”194 Such developments 
resulted in a higher concentration of civilians and other infrastructure in the southern 
states of Malaysia, including Singaporeans living there and their properties. Therefore, 
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the conduct of preemptive strikes on these territories in the event of hostilities,195 a plan 
central to the Porcupine strategy, could no longer be easily executed without severe 
repercussions. In addition, economic growth enabled Malaysia to modernize the MAF 
substantially, although the SAF remained a superior force.196 Huxley asserts that, 
“between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, it appeared that the MAF’s developing 
conventional capabilities might considerably undermine Singapore’s existing military 
superiority,” and this concerned the PAP leadership. With a larger defense budget, 
Malaysia was able to upgrade its air force with advanced strike aircraft and “a more 
credible national air defense system, threatening to reduce the likely effectiveness of pre-
emptive air strikes by Singapore”197 in the event of war, and thus supporting the push for 
a change in military strategy.  
The combined effects of “rapid urbanization”198 in Johor, and the modernization 
of the MAF thus complicated the SAF’s ability to swiftly and decisively capture military 
objectives in the direct manner intended as part of the Porcupine strategy. In addition, 
economic growth also enabled the Royal Malaysian Navy to upgrade its aging fleet and 
procure submarine capabilities in response to similar developments in the RSN, 
challenging the Porcupine strategy’s ability to achieve limited sea denial. Wu argues that 
these factors changed the operating conditions that the SAF would face in the event of 
war. Thus, it drove the need for a new military strategy that not only gave the SAF the 
capability to conduct sea control operations, but also the added flexibility to conduct 
joint-level operations at extended ranges so as to dilute Malaysia’s military resources and 
complicate its defense plans.  
d. Increasing Manpower Constraints  
Another unintended outcome of the changing economic conditions was the 
creation of manpower constraints, which inevitably contributed to the shift from the 
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Porcupine to the Dolphin strategy. Boosted by rapid economic growth, and in line with 
changes in military strategy, the SAF’s capabilities and force size had grown “almost 
exponentially”199 since the 1960s, most notably during the Porcupine era when the RSAF 
and RSN, in particular, expanded to fulfill their roles for air superiority and protection of 
the SLOCs, respectively. Unfortunately, the effect of Singapore’s “declining birth 
rate”200—ironically also resulting from economically driven policies prior to the 1980s—
coincided with the Porcupine phase, when “the SAF’s requirements expanded at the same 
time that the size of the overall 18-year-old cohort declined.”201 In addition, Huxley 
argues that, “mainly because of Singapore’s economic success, recruiting regular officers 
and non-commissioned officers (NCO) has been a perennial problem.”202 He attributes 
this to the better career prospects and pay packages offered by the private sector. These 
factors exacerbated the “SAF’s need to exploit modern military technology in order to 
compensate for its manpower constraints.”203 Analysts agree that the SAF was faced with 
the long-term reality of leaner manpower, smarter personnel, and more females, and this 
meant that the Porcupine strategy, which was service-centric and depended heavily on a 
large RSAF and RSN, would no longer be a suitable option moving forward. Singapore 
thus needed a new military strategy that could reap the synergies of integrated and joint 
operations, effectively allowing the SAF to do more using technologically advanced 
platforms but with fewer people.  
e. Technological and Structural Challenges 
Benefiting from Singapore’s economic strength, the SAF was able to rely more 
heavily on technology to maintain its advantage over potential adversaries, support the 
shift toward joint operations, and also to find a solution for its manpower constraints. 
Specifically, Singapore adopted the RMA approach, and started investing and planning 
for this transition since the early 1990s, made possible by the rapid economic growth 
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experienced in the 1980s. However, Loo suggests that although adopting the RMA 
approach solved one set of problems for Singapore, it brought about a different set of 
challenges that forced structural and doctrinal changes in the SAF to adapt to the 
technological evolution. This in turn contributed to the need for a change in Singapore’s 
military strategy. 
RMA has enabled the SAF to maintain an overwhelming superiority over 
potential adversaries in the region through technological advancement and capability 
upgrades. Nevertheless, “these new types of capabilities require radically different modus 
operandi for their effects to be maximized,”204 and this has driven the shift in military 
strategy. The RMA approach is also very expensive. Loo asserts that “for the SAF, this 
increasing cost of new technologies may result in a form of structural disarmament,”205 
meaning that newer platforms purchased to replace existing ones “would almost certainly 
be lesser in number”206 due to the astronomical costs involved. To Loo, “a case in point 
is the Singapore Air Force’s decision to replace its existing fleet of over 40 F-5Es with 12 
F-15SGs.”207 Fewer platforms have also meant that attrition, if any, would be less 
acceptable. Such considerations may also result in military planners opting for less risky 
and higher payoff alternatives to meet their objectives. As such, having fewer but 
technologically more advanced platforms may help alleviate the manpower issues faced 
by the SAF, but it has introduced other challenges. Previous doctrines adopted as part of 
the Porcupine that were dependent on specific platforms or numbers for successful 
execution had to be changed. Thus, these changes rendered the Porcupine ineffective and 
have driven the need for a new military strategy.  
3. Change of International Norms and Expectations 
How the world viewed Singapore mattered to the young nation’s leaders, who 
were keen to improve Singapore’s international standing and image. As such, 
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Singapore’s leadership became increasingly responsive to any changes in international 
norms and expectations, in particular, the involvement of military beyond conventional 
roles and also the perception of Singapore as a responsible member of the international 
community. 
a. Military Involvement Beyond Conventional Roles 
Since the 1990s, the SAF has gradually become more involved in operations other 
than war, both regionally and internationally. This coincided with the “increasing social 
and international expectation of military involvement in delivering humanitarian 
assistance”208 and in international efforts against the threats of terrorism and piracy that 
were emerging at that time. Prior to the 1990s, Singapore’s military resources were 
limited to conventional roles, focusing mainly on deterrence, self-defense, and 
maintaining security in the sub-region. The SAF’s increasing involvement beyond its 
conventional roles therefore reflected the Singaporean leadership’s willingness to cater to 
international norms and expectations, albeit within limits. The challenge, however, was 
that neither the SAF nor the Porcupine strategy was designed to manage this long term. 
Changes were thus required. 
As evidence of the shift in mindset, “Singapore’s defense minister, Ng Eng Hen, 
has argued that the involvement of militaries in [Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief] 
(HADR) is no longer the exception but has increasingly become the norm.”209 In this 
aspect, Singapore’s leaders were keen to assure international partners that Singapore 
“contribute[s] not in words but in deeds.”210 Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Teo 
Chee Hean stressed, “Without being able to contribute to the [regional and international] 
security architecture and having a capable SAF, Singapore would play a much more 
diminished role and we would not have the same voice at the table.”211 Increasingly, 
Singapore’s leadership has shared the view that the “SAF’s usefulness is not defined 
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solely in terms of deterrence against external attack but equally that of creating 
international space for Singapore and ensuring for itself freedom of manoeuver.”212 In 
addition, Huxley asserts that by the early 2000s, there were strong indications that the 
United States was keen “to display its soft power in terms of leading and funding relief 
and reconstruction efforts”213 in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s active participation and 
regional leadership in HADR would help anchor its position as a partner of choice with 
the Americans. As such, “to satisfy these new roles, the SAF needed to become more 
flexible in doctrinal and strategic thought.”214 In addition, due to the nature and operating 
conditions expected of operations other than war, the navy stood out as the most effective 
and practical way by which Singapore could achieve this new objective at a sustainable 
level, especially when these operations are conducted far beyond Southeast Asia.215 
These reasons helped pave the way for the Dolphin strategy, which in comparison to the 
Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine, was designed to be more adept at managing 
emerging non-conventional requirements. 
b. Responsible Member of The International Community 
Singapore is a small country with big ambitions. Its leaders are cognizant that 
besides being able to defend itself from aggressors, the nation’s success and long-term 
survivability depend on it being an “active, constructive player which seeks to add value 
and be relevant to other countries”216 on the international stage. Inevitably, Singapore’s 
enthusiasm in contributing to the international community has also been influenced by 
economic considerations as the nation-state “has managed to thrive by interweaving its 
economy into the existing international system.”217 By the 1990s, Singapore had become 
                                                 
212 See Seng Tan, “Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves,” 338. 
213 Huxley, “Southeast Asia in 2004,” 15. 
214 Chian, “Should the SAF Maintain Its Existing Focus on Full-Spectrum Dominance?” 34. 
215 Koh, “Seeking Balance,” 77. 
216 “Singapore Won’t Accept Being Powerless on International Stage as Its Fate: PM Lee.” Straits 
Times, November 27, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-wont-accept-being-
powerless-on-international-stage-as-its-fate-pm-lee. 
217 Chian, “Should the SAF Maintain Its Existing Focus on Full-Spectrum Dominance?” 34. 
 54
“firmly committed to its preservation,”218 including the protection of “institutions and 
norms reinforcing the mechanisms of global trade,”219 of which “90 per cent of the 
world’s commerce is carried by sea.”220 Singapore’s leaders have also “recognize[d] that 
it is not possible for any one country to protect its own shipping in all the world’s key sea 
lanes.”221 Thus, to benefit from international cooperation and protection, Singapore 
needed to contribute as a “responsible stakeholder and not [behave] as a free rider.”222 
Therefore, a new strategy was needed that enabled the island-state to play a more active 
role as a “responsible member of the international community.”223 Such requirements 
facilitated the shift to the Dolphin strategy. 
C. SUMMARY  
The combined effects of the new security environment, economic growth, and to a 
lesser extent, changing international norms and expectations made it necessary for 
Singapore to make the transition from the Porcupine to the Dolphin strategy in the 2000s. 
Compared to the first shift to the Porcupine, the considerations and options available to 
Singapore during the second shift to the Dolphin were vastly very different. In particular, 
as Singapore underwent rapid economic growth from the 1980s onwards, more options 
became available to the nation-state in managing its vulnerabilities and security concerns. 
Singapore’s successful economy increased the stakes of conflict for the young nation; 
more than ever, ensuring Singapore’s national security now included protecting its 
economic infrastructure, securing investor confidence, and contributing to regional and 
international stability as well. In addition, as Singapore became more integrated and 
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interdependent with the rest of the world, economic growth contributed to newer types of 
security concerns and also made Singapore’s leadership more responsive to international 
pressures. The shift to the Dolphin strategy reflected these considerations. The result is a 
military strategy that is not only equally adept at addressing both conventional and non-
conventional threats, it also contributes to confidence building and cooperation amongst 
regional and international stakeholders. In addition, while the Dolphin has continued to 
benefit from the supply of technologically advanced weaponry from Israel’s dynamic 
military industries, there has been a deliberate effort on the part of Singapore’s leadership 
to preserve the existing stable conditions conducive for continued economic growth. That 
has necessitated a shift away from the aggressive Israeli-like image associated with the 
Porcupine to the projection of “we are willing to be friends with everyone” as the primary 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
This thesis analyzed the reasons for the two shifts in Singapore’s military strategy 
as separate case studies, testing the relative strengths of the two hypotheses articulated in 
Chapter I. Research for this thesis revealed that the evolution of Singapore’s military 
strategy was driven by three key factors: change of security environment, change of 
economic conditions, and to a lesser extent, change of international norms and 
expectations. The evidence examined in Chapters II and III support the argument that the 
change of security environment was the underlying driving force for the first shift, while 
the change of economic conditions was the main cause of the second. Significantly, these 
findings contribute to the broader understanding that a country’s security environment is 
not necessarily the most influential in shaping its military strategy. Changes in economic 
conditions, once the country’s economic potential has been sufficiently realized, can have 
a similar, if not greater, impact on its military strategy as well. In addition, by examining 
how the three key factors identified drove the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy, 
this thesis was also able to explain how the Poisonous Shrimp, the Porcupine, and the 
Dolphin came to exist in their eventual forms. In turn, each phase of Singapore’s military 
strategy also shaped its corresponding generation of the SAF. In the process, by showing 
how the Porcupine strategy was shaped by specific requirements that the Poisonous 
Shrimp could not address, this thesis established that the first shift was indeed substantive 
and necessary. This is possible because each evolutionary stage of Singapore’s military 
strategy was designed in response to the challenges preceding it, and also in anticipation 
of expected threats moving forward. In concluding the thesis, this chapter is organized 
into three sections. Section A summarizes the findings to explain how the conclusion was 
derived. Next, Section B provides a concluding analysis by comparing the relative 
strengths of the three key factors discussed and their overall impact as drivers of change 
in Singapore’s military strategy. Finally, from the insights drawn from the preceding two 
sections, Section C offers an analysis of a potential third shift. 
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
What contributed to the shift from the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine? Were 
the factors that drove the first shift similar to those that drove the second shift, or were 
they drastically different? This section summarizes the key findings as a lead-up to the 
concluding analysis in Section B of this chapter. 
1. The First Shift 
From the onset, the Poisonous Shrimp seemed like a desperate attempt to quickly 
devise a workable strategy; it also reflected the lack of experience and readiness on the 
part of Singapore’s pioneer leadership to undertake the responsibility of Singapore’s 
defense. Besides, the Poisonous Shrimp was designed with certain assumptions, like the 
expectation that the provisions in the Separation Agreement with Malaysia, such as those 
concerning the water supply, would be honored without threats, but this was not to be. It 
quickly became clear to Singapore’s leadership that a change in military strategy was 
required. The shift from the Poisonous Shrimp to the Porcupine thus took place in the 
early 1980s against the backdrop of sub-regional tensions that had been a persistent 
feature since Singapore’s independence in 1965. This resulted in a consistency between 
the Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine on the use of the SAF to achieve primarily 
military-related outcomes on specific adversaries. Such a consistency existed because the 
specific threats faced in the eras of the Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine, though 
different, remained within the realm of territorial and sovereignty-related security 
concerns. Singapore’s leadership believed such concerns were best resolved through the 
use of Israeli-styled aggressive military force when required. Despite the similar focus, 
however, both strategies were designed to achieve their respective objectives in 
drastically different ways. The Poisonous Shrimp was designed for passive deterrence 
while the Porcupine strategy was designed for active deterrence. As argued in Chapter II, 
this outcome can be attributed to the two key factors that drove the shift to the Porcupine, 
which were a change of security environment and the change in economic conditions. 
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a. Change of Security Environment  
Since independence, Singapore’s strategic planners and leadership have 
consistently considered the nation-state’s security environment as a key factor in shaping 
its military strategy. The Poisonous Shrimp strategy was designed primarily in response 
to Singapore’s security environment early in its independence. Up to the early 1970s, 
Singapore faced a security environment that its leadership perceived to be threatening to 
its existence as a sovereign nation. This perception thus shaped the Poisonous Shrimp 
strategy to achieve the primary objective of ensuring survival by deterring invasion. In 
the years leading up to the 1980s, Singapore grew economically, but its security 
environment worsened and the Poisonous Shrimp strategy could no longer adequately 
deal with the changes that were taking place. Two key changes contributed to this new 
security environment for Singapore. First, sub-regional relations deteriorated. The 
heightened tensions, mainly with Malaysia, were characterized by territorial disputes over 
Pedra Branca and threats to cut off the supply of water to Singapore. Malaysia and 
Indonesia also attempted to apply political pressure on Singapore, infringing on its 
sovereignty. The strategy of deterring invasion alone was clearly insufficient to protect 
Singapore’s national interests. Second, there were emerging regional and extra-regional 
security threats, forcing Singapore to consider projecting its military influence beyond the 
sub-region. As a result, the change of security environment became the main driver for 
the shift to the Porcupine strategy, with Singapore’s economic growth facilitating the 
shift by funding necessary military capability upgrades. 
b. Change of Economic Conditions 
In the period leading up to the early 1980s, Singapore faced more immediate and 
existential threats stemming from the changes in the security environment. As such, 
economic factors, though important, were limited to a supporting role in driving the shift 
to the Porcupine; nonetheless, this was also the period in which Singapore’s leadership 
and military planners alike began to pay more attention to how its military strategy could 
potentially affect the nation’s goal of sustained economic development. Two key factors 
contributed to the change of economic conditions in Singapore, which when combined 
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with the pressures created by the change of security environment, made the shift to the 
Porcupine compelling. First, Singapore’s rapid economic growth made the island-state 
increasingly dependent on its foreign economic partners and international investors. It 
thus became vital for Singapore to shed the defeatist Poisonous Shrimp for another 
strategy that could secure investor confidence in the long term. Second, Singapore’s 
investments in its ports and its growing dependency on seaborne trade made it necessary 
for the island-state to expand its security focus to include the maritime domain. These 
economic factors exposed further weaknesses of the Poisonous Shrimp strategy, 
reinforcing the need for change. 
2. The Second Shift 
The shift from the Porcupine to the Dolphin was officially declared in the early-
2000s, and though it occurred during a period of uncertainty characterized by key 
leadership transitions in the sub-region, territorial disputes, and post-Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, the Dolphin strategy did not project an aggressively deterrent military 
posture similar to both the Poisonous Shrimp and the Porcupine. Instead the Dolphin was 
designed with a focus on fostering military cooperation and confidence building on both 
the regional and the international stage. Notwithstanding these positive features, the 
Dolphin strategy retained a strong focus on deterrence, albeit evidently in a preventive 
and less directed approach to specific adversaries. These wide ranging considerations 
were thus key in shaping the 3G SAF designed for full-spectrum dominance and with an 
increasing focus on the maritime domain. Significantly, the Dolphin also displayed an 
increased focus on deterring threats to Singapore’s economic interests, an outcome of the 
economic considerations that drove the second shift, which was evidently lacking in the 
first. As argued in Chapter III, the shift to the Dolphin strategy was driven by three key 
factors: change in the security environment, change of economic conditions, and to a 
lesser extent, a change in international norms and expectations. 
a. Change of Security Environment  
In the second shift, the change of security environment remains a key driver; 
however, compared to the first shift, it was less influential. This observation can be 
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attributed to the general improvement of Singapore’s security environment in the second 
shift, which contrasts with the deterioration of security environment experienced in the 
first. The changes to Singapore’s security environment experienced mainly during the 
1990s drove the second shift in two ways. First, improved sub-regional relations gave 
Singapore’s strategic planners more confidence and flexibility to adopt a less aggressive 
posture to achieve deterrence in the Dolphin strategy. In part, this improvement in sub-
regional relations was bolstered by respective sub-regional leaders’ desire to preserve the 
peace and stability that had contributed to the shared economic growth experienced in the 
region. Second, the Porcupine strategy was unable to address concerns over the growth of 
regional navies and the emergence of non-conventional threats beginning in the 1990s, 
which also had an impact on Singapore’s economy. Their combined effects thus forced 
Singapore to broaden the focus of its military strategy to include the deliberate protection 
of Singapore’s economic interests and related infrastructure, which facilitated the shift to 
the Dolphin strategy.  
b. Change of Economic Conditions 
When compared to the first shift, it is evident why the change in economic 
conditions emerged as the most significant factor in driving the shift to the Dolphin. 
Besides indirectly influencing and facilitating the evolution, changes in economic 
conditions had a direct impact on the shift to the Dolphin strategy as well. Five key 
factors were identified. First, consistent economic growth raised the opportunity costs of 
conflict for Singapore and the region, regardless of the length or magnitude of the 
conflict. This made the aggressive posture of the Porcupine strategy increasingly 
unattractive to Singapore’s leaders and citizens alike. Second, economic power enabled 
Singapore to seek alternative means and suppliers to reduce the nation’s dependencies on 
Malaysia for food and water. Such changes facilitated increased flexibility in policy 
making and in evolving Singapore’s military strategy. Third, shared economic growth in 
the region resulted in changes in expected operating conditions, complicating existing 
military plans. In particular, the combined effects of urbanization in Johor and the 
modernization of the MAF made it impossible for the SAF, during war, to successfully 
execute pre-emptive strikes in the direct manner as intended in the Porcupine strategy 
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without severe repercussions. Fourth, as a result of economic polices and growth, the 
SAF faced increasing manpower constraints. This factor made the manpower-heavy 
Porcupine strategy unsuitable and created pressures for Singapore to adopt a new strategy 
that leveraged more on technology to compensate for the lack of manpower. Fifth, also as 
an outcome of economic considerations, the SAF adopted the RMA approach, which 
resulted in structural and doctrinal changes. These changes were necessary but conflicted 
with the design of the Porcupine strategy and thus necessitated a change in strategy. 
Separately, economic factors also appear to have shaped Singapore’s security 
environment and its considerations to comply with international norms and expectations.  
c. Change of International Norms and Expectations  
As a driving force for the shift to the Dolphin strategy, a change in international 
norms and expectations was not as influential compared to the changes in security 
environment and economic conditions. Its impact, however, was significant enough not to 
be discounted. Two key factors contributed to the change. First, beginning in the 1990s, 
there was an increasing global expectation for militaries to contribute beyond their 
conventional roles, particularly in the areas of Search and Rescue and HADR. Second, as 
Singapore’s economy grew increasingly interwoven with the international system, there 
was a growing concern on the part of Singapore’s leadership for the island-state to be 
seen as a responsible member of the international community so as to benefit from 
international cooperation and protection. This required Singapore’s active participation in 
international efforts to fight terrorism and piracy in theatres beyond traditional areas of 
concern. The Porcupine was a conventional military strategy focused primarily on using 
the SAF to achieve military outcomes on potential adversaries and thus was unsuitable to 
meet these new objectives, paving the way for the Dolphin.  
B. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the relative strengths and overall impact of the security 
environment, economic conditions, and international norms and expectations as drivers 
for change in Singapore’s military strategy.  
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1. Security Environment 
Prior to the 1980s, Singapore’s existence as a sovereign state was most threatened 
by its security environment; when the security environment deteriorated, however, the 
Poisonous Shrimp strategy became inadequate and had to be replaced. It was thus 
unsurprising that the changed security environment would feature as the main factor that 
drove the shift to the Porcupine, even as the importance of economic considerations was 
rapidly growing. By the late 1990s, however, Singapore’s economy was booming at the 
same time that its security environment was also becoming less threatening; in terms of 
its influence, the need for Singapore’s economic interests to be more seriously integrated 
with its military strategy grew considerably. New challenges also emerged as a result of 
Singapore’s economic growth, which the Porcupine strategy was ineffective in dealing. 
As such, though it remained important, the impact of the security environment on the 
second shift was thus notably reduced. Nonetheless, the transition to the Dolphin strategy 
also occurred during a period of relative uncertainty due to the emergence of 
unconventional threats, such as terrorism and piracy, which posed serious challenges to 
Singapore’s territorial and economic security. As a result, the Dolphin retained a strong 
deterrent factor, albeit with a greater focus on the maritime and non-conventional aspect. 
In sum, Singapore’s security environment has been a consistent influence on the 
evolution process of the country’s military strategy, and it is likely to remain as such; it 
took a less prominent role in the second shift due to the comparatively more benign threat 
environment, which coincided with the maturity of Singapore’s economy. This dynamic 
afforded increased flexibility and capacity to broaden the scope of Singapore’s military 
strategy in the shift to the Dolphin. 
2. Economic Conditions 
In the first shift, Singapore’s economy, though undergoing rapid growth, was not 
developed enough to make a considerable impact on its military strategy and thus played 
a supporting role. In contrast, the change of economic conditions stood out as the most 
influential factor in the second shift. This factor not only caused direct and indirect 
pressure for change to the Dolphin, it contributed to shaping Singapore’s security 
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environment and the nation’s general conformance to international norms and 
expectations as well. The shift to the Dolphin was also assessed to be more drastic than 
the first, primarily because it represented Singapore’s first step away from an aggressive 
approach to ensure its security. This shift toward a less aggressive posturing of its 
military strategy can be attributed to two reasons. First, due to generally improved 
relations with its neighbors, there was more impetus to reduce tension and preserve the 
peace and stability that was vital in facilitating Singapore’s rapid economic growth. 
Second, in terms of importance, Singapore’s focus on economic security finally “caught 
up” with its traditional emphasis on territorial security. By the 1990s, Singapore’s 
economy had become so important that any attempt to cripple its economy, whether by 
conventional or non-conventional means, was considered by the country’s leaders to be 
equivalent to a direct territorial attack. These two outcomes are key in understanding how 
Singapore’s economic interests gradually became increasingly integrated with its military 
strategy.  
The comparison of both shifts also revealed a strong and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between Singapore’s security environment and economic conditions, with 
notable examples observed over the past 50 years since the nation declared independence. 
In the early years, concerns over security environment influenced economic policies and 
investments in Singapore’s defense industries and renewable water technologies despite 
doubts on the economic benefits of such policies. Economic crisis in the late 1990s did 
little to derail the plans for military capability upgrades and transition to the Dolphin 
strategy. The pursuit of these plans reflected Singapore’s focus on maintaining its 
military advantage over potential adversaries and the importance of the economy in 
ensuring it. This relationship strengthened with the consistent economic growth 
experienced in Singapore and in the region, and it is likely to persist moving forward, 
continuing to shape the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy.  
3. International Norms and Expectations 
The pressure on Singapore to conform to international norms and expectations 
became strong in the early 2000s even as the region was recovering from financial crisis 
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in the late 1990s. The emergence of threats such as maritime piracy and terrorism also 
exacerbated Singapore’s sense of vulnerability, both territorially and economically. The 
shift to the Dolphin amid such circumstances thus reflects a silent confidence in the 
island-state’s perception of its economic strengths and the security climate in the sub-
region; this coincided with the Singaporean leadership’s acknowledgment that the 2000s 
presented a window of opportunity to strengthen Singapore’s international standing, 
contributions, and thus relevance to the world. This was an opportunity Singapore’s 
leaders were eager to leverage. In sum, as a factor on its own, the change of international 
norms and expectations would not be able to exert sufficient pressure on shape 
Singapore’s military strategy. Singapore’s pragmatic approach ensures that its leadership 
prioritizes against threats to its security environment and economic interests, both of 
which, by the 2000s, have come to be considered existential. Combined with security and 
economic considerations, however, international pressures can play an important role in 
shaping the evolution of Singapore’s military strategy. 
C. WHAT’S NEXT, SINGAPORE?  
This thesis was not intended to be predictive; however, it does provide important 
analyses and insights to what can be expected of Singapore’s next shift in military 
strategy.  
1. Key Assumptions and Expected Drivers of the Next Shift 
If current regional and global trends persist, it is likely that economic factors will 
continue to be the most influential factor driving the next shift in Singapore’s military 
strategy. This assumption acknowledges the importance of consistent economic excellence 
in ensuring political and social stability within the nation-state, and in fueling the SAF’s 
capability and technological advancement so as to maintain military superiority over 
potential adversaries. As such, Singapore’s leadership and strategic planners will have to 
pay special attention to changes in economic conditions so as to facilitate uninterrupted 
growth while at the same time protect Singapore’s economic interests by ensuring SLOC 
security and contributing to regional and international stability. Economic considerations 
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and other threats to territorial security are thus expected to continue to be integrated as part 
of Singapore’s military strategy. 
Like the factors that drove the second shift, change of security environment will 
remain a close second in terms of influence, ensuring that Singapore’s next military 
strategy maintains an even focus on both conventional and non-conventional threats. This 
assumes that sub-regional relations will likely remain warm despite recent domestic issues 
in Malaysia, affording Singapore the capacity to invest more focus and resources in 
strengthening against terrorism and cyber-related threats. Regionally and internationally, 
though, there are causes for concern. In particular, there is increasing uncertainty over 
China’s ambitions in the South China Sea, and also concerns about the United States’ 
commitment in Southeast Asia and as a world leader after the 2016 U.S. presidential 
elections. As such, amidst such sentiments of uncertainty, it is likely that the RSN and the 
RSAF will continue to play crucial roles in enhancing Singapore’s strategic depth and at 
the same time facilitate a wider range of opportunities to foster military cooperation and 
confidence building in the region and with other international partners.  
2. What Are the Options? 
When asked what he thought the next zoological analogy for Singapore’s military 
strategy might be, Loo suggested the “Bee.”224 Loo reasoned that, “Bees are highly 
organized, social animals, who attack enemies by swarming against the enemy and 
driving it off with multiple stings.”225 His prediction is also based on the analysis that the 
SAF seems likely to develop toward adopting “smaller combat teams swarming against 
the enemy.”226 Alternatively, the next phase of Singapore’s military strategy could also 
adopt the form of an “Octopus.”227 The idea was discussed in an interesting BBC article 
written by Christopher Mims in which Mims compared the analogy of the “Octopus” to 
                                                 





the Petraeus doctrine.228 Mims asserted that, “The Petraeus doctrine is exactly the sort of 
thing an octopus would do. Despite its well-organized central nervous system, many of an 
octopus’s reactions are decentralized. Its individual cells make their own decisions for 
dealing with the immediate situation—enabling, for example, the invertebrate’s famously 
varied camouflage.”229 While both the analogies of the “Bee” and the “Octopus” are by no 
means the only possible options moving forward, they do exhibit attractive features that are 
also in line with the expected developmental trajectory of the SAF. The “Bee” and the 
“Octopus” are thus credible candidates for the next evolutionary stage of Singapore’s 
military strategy.  
Considering the key assumptions discussed, and the expected drivers of 
Singapore’s next shift in military strategy, the “Octopus,” rather than the “Bee,” stands out 
as the more likely of the two because it espouses a more adaptive, flexible, and 
intelligence-driven approach, capable not only of responding to the changes in Singapore’s 
economic conditions and security environment, but also in managing the “biggest 
dangers,”230 which Mims asserts are those threats that have yet to be identified.231 What 
makes the “Octopus” analogy particularly attractive is that one of its key tenets is based on 
the concept of “redundancy,”232 which gives the strategy an added flexibility to adapt to 
emerging threats. Mims elaborates: “Defensively and offensively, an octopus has no 
shortage of coping mechanisms—camouflage, powerful arms, intelligence, a sharp beak, 
symbiotic toxins, and a cloud of ink.”233 Such a concept also would take the 3G SAF’s 
current goal of achieving full-spectrum dominance one step further, leveraging on various 
multi-role military capabilities so as to excel in both conventional military missions and 
non-conventional operations when required.  
 
                                                 
228 Loo, “Zoological Analogies and Military Strategy.” 
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